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estimate a household-level discrete choice model of drinking water. We find that the average household is
willing to pay $162 per year to avoid a one standard deviation decrease in water quality. We additionally
find that WTP for bottled water increases in income. We use these estimates to evaluate several
counterfactual scenarios. In a scenario in which the United States' water infrastructure deteriorates to the
levels of Flint, MI in 2014, we find that US households would be willing to spend 1.4 times the annual US
public spending on water infrastructure, suggesting that consumer preferences strongly justify major
increases in water infrastructure investments in the United States.The second chapter studies the design
of renewable energy portfolios standards (RPSs). We focus on solar energy and analyze two common
RPS rules: cross-state trading restrictions and state-specific interim annual targets. Using historically
observed RPSs, together with our estimated state-level solar supply curves, we find that allowing for
cross-state trading reduces cost by 24% and significantly changes the geographic distribution of new
solar installations. Removing interim annual targets over the 2015-2019 period reduces cost by 32% by
back-loading installations to later years. These cost reductions become much larger when considering
more ambitious RPS targets. Our results suggest that more flexible program design such as allowing for
cross-state trading, back-loading interim targets, or banking and borrowing renewable energy credits can
avoid escalating costs and preserve the political feasibility of renewable energy standards
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS
Felipe Flores-Golfin
Jose Miguel Abito
In the first chapter of this dissertation we evaluate potential benefits of drinking water infrastructure investments in the United States. We estimate willingness-to-pay for high-quality
drinking water using consumer avoidance behavior in response to health-based drinking
water quality violations. To do so we estimate a household-level discrete choice model of
drinking water. We find that the average household is willing to pay $162 per year to avoid
a one standard deviation decrease in water quality. We additionally find that WTP for bottled water increases in income. We use these estimates to evaluate several counterfactual
scenarios. In a scenario in which the United States’ water infrastructure deteriorates to the
levels of Flint, MI in 2014, we find that US households would be willing to spend 1.4 times
the annual US public spending on water infrastructure, suggesting that consumer preferences strongly justify major increases in water infrastructure investments in the United
States. The second chapter studies the design of renewable energy portfolios standards
(RPSs). We focus on solar energy and analyze two common RPS rules: cross-state trading
restrictions and state-specific interim annual targets. Using historically observed RPSs,
together with our estimated state-level solar supply curves, we find that allowing for crossstate trading reduces cost by 24% and significantly changes the geographic distribution of
new solar installations. Removing interim annual targets over the 2015-2019 period reduces
cost by 32% by back-loading installations to later years. These cost reductions become
much larger when considering more ambitious RPS targets. Our results suggest that more
flexible program design such as allowing for cross-state trading, back-loading interim targets, or banking and borrowing renewable energy credits can avoid escalating costs and
preserve the political feasibility of renewable energy standards.
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CHAPTER 1 : Estimating Willingness-to-Pay for Water Quality in the US
1.1.

Introduction
I can tell you that Flint, Michigan is the tip of the iceberg... I can tell you for
certain that this is a national crisis that we are not getting ready to face. The
crisis is already here.
Erin Brockovich, environmental activist (2016)

Soon after the first scientific discoveries concerning the sources and consequences of drinking
water contaminants in the late 19th century, the United States Public Health Service (PHS)
set standards to regulate water utilities. These standards evolved through the first half of
the 20th century, and by 1962 all 50 states had created regulations or guidelines for public
water systems. Nevertheless, in 1969 only 60 percent of water systems delivered water
which met all PHS standards and over half of treatment facilities had major deficiencies.1
In response, the federal government passed the Clean and Safe Drinking Water Acts of
1972 and 1974, respectively. These acts increased federal infrastructure spending on water
utilities from less than $2.5 billion to almost $20 billion by the late 1970s (Congressional
Budget Office (2015)). This led to significant water quality improvements in the country.
Today, the United States is again experiencing a drinking water crisis. The country faces
chronic under-investment in water infrastructure (American Society of Civil Engineers
(2020a)) and as many as 63 million people were exposed to potentially unsafe water more
than once during the past decade (Philip et al., 2017). High profile cases like that of Flint,
Michigan have drawn attention to the issue and increased concerns about drinking water
quality. However, the high sticker price of infrastructure improvements generates debate
over whether these investments are fully justified.
Our paper addresses this question by evaluating potential benefits of investments in water
infrastructure that would tackle the US drinking water crisis. Specifically, we consider the
extent to which households value improvements in drinking water quality (Greenstone and
1

EPA (1999), EPA (2000)

1

Jack, 2013). We therefore build and estimate a model of drinking water consumption to
recover households’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improvements in drinking water quality.
Our model builds on two empirical observations. First, that households react to decreases
in drinking water quality by increasing their consumption of alternatives to tap water.
Specifically, bottled water. Second, that these reactions are heterogeneous. Higher income
households have a stronger reaction to changes in drinking water quality.
Households’ avoidance behavior in the form of increased consumption of bottled water
reveals a WTP for water quality. Therefore, in our model households face a discrete choice
between two sources of drinking water: tap and bottled water. Households’ preferences for
these alternatives depend on the cost of bottled water and on the quality of tap water. Our
model captures heterogeneity in avoidance behavior by allowing these preferences to vary
with income.
To estimate the model, we use number of EPA water standards violations as a measure
of water quality. Because utilities are required to inform consumers of existing violations,
violations serve as a salient, quantifiable indicator of water quality with temporal and
geographic variation. Mandatory notifications provide objective information about the risks
of consuming tap water that is in violation of the EPA standards: see Appendix A.3.2 for
an example of a Tier 1 notification template. Furthermore, EPA violations constitutes
the best available measure of drinking water quality at the national level. Nevertheless,
violations are not an all-encompassing measure of drinking water quality. We are unable to
evaluate avoidance behavior that may arise from concerns such as water taste or lead pipes
in housing. Households may also react more strongly to a water quality issue when it is
labeled as a violation: we cannot disentangle the “alarm" effect from the information effect.
We find that the average household’s marginal WTP for an improvement of one standard
deviation in water quality is $2.33 per gallon of drinking water. This amounts to an annual
WTP of $162.12 for a household consuming a typical level of plain drinking water. We also

2

find that there are significant differences in WTP by income levels. A household with an
income of $95,000 is willing to pay $6.57 per gallon of drinking water, while a household
with an income of $35,000 is willing to pay $0.70.
We use these estimates to compute aggregate willingness to pay under two counterfactual
scenarios. First, we focus on US households which receive tap water from utilities with at
least one violation in the period of 2000 to 2017. We find that these households would have
been willing to pay $15.9 billion per year to reduce these violations to zero. This figure is
approximately 9 times higher than the average annual budget of the EPA’s Drinking Water
State Revolving Loan Fund (DWSRF),2 and is comparable to the EPA’s estimated needs
for rehabilitation, replacement and upgrade of existing infrastructure for the next 20 years,
which totals approximately $17.2 billion dollars annually. These comparison points suggest that households’ valuation of high-quality drinking water justifies the public spending
needed to guarantee that all water utilities meet the existing EPA standards.
Our second counterfactual attempts to evaluate total public spending on water utilities,
noting that water infrastructure would rapidly depreciate in the absence of this spending.
We consider a hypothetical scenario where this depreciation leads to a nationwide crisis
of the same level as that of Flint, MI in 2014. Under this extreme scenario, we find an
aggregate WTP of $160 billion per year to restore safe drinking water. This amount is
41% higher than total annual public spending3 in water infrastructure, indicating that
households’ WTP easily reconciles current public spending on water utilities.
Together our results suggest that households’ valuation of drinking water quality justifies
current spending on drinking water infrastructure and likely justifies much larger investments. The recently approved infrastructure bill proposed by the Biden administration
takes steps in this direction by increasing the DWSRF by an average of $7 billion over the
2

The DWSRF is a federal financial assistance program to help water systems and states to achieve the
health protection objectives of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
3
Congressional Budget Office (2018)

3

next five years.4 . However, we find that this increase may still fall short of households’
willingness-to-pay for safe drinking water access.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we contribute to the literature attempting
to estimate willingness-to-pay for environmental quality. Quantifying WTP for publicly
provided environmental amenities is notoriously elusive; previous papers have used surveybased methods (Chatterjee et al., 2017; Jordan and Elnagheeb, 1993; Beaumais et al., 2014;
Whitehead, 2006), which have been heavily criticized in the past (Hausman (2012)). An
emerging literature exploits revealed preferences to obtain more reliable estimates of WTP
for environmental amenities, including air quality in China (Ito and Zhang (2020)) and
water quality in Kenya (Kremer et al. (2011)). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
the first to estimate WTP for drinking water quality in the US using a revealed preference
approach, which allow us to conduct a comparison to survey-based estimates.
Our second contribution is to the ongoing discussion regarding infrastructure spending in
the United States. Our analysis of households’ avoidance behavior offers an alternative
measure of the benefits of drinking water infrastructure investments. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first to introduce this alternative. Our findings and methodology
complement existing cost-benefit analysis methods based on the value of statistical life used
by the EPA (Viscusi and Aldy (2003)).
Finally, we contribute to the literature concerning avoidance and averting behavior against
drinking water pollution (Zivin et al., 2011; Allaire et al., 2019; Whitehead et al., 1998).
We study households’ responses to changes in drinking water quality and consider other
alternatives to tap water besides bottled water. We do not find evidence that households
increase their consumption of these other alternatives.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides the institutional setting
and describes the data. Section 1.3 presents reduced form evidence of households’ avoidance
behavior. Section 1.4 introduces our model of drinking water consumption. In Section 1.5
4

EPA (2021), Volcovici (2021)

4

we present our counterfactual results. In Section 2.5 we conclude.

1.2.

Institutional Setting and Data

1.2.1. Drinking Water Quality in the US
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 established drinking water quality standards for all
public water systems5 in the country. These standards set maximum contaminant levels
(MCLs) for over 90 contaminants in drinking water and establish rules for water-testing
schedules and methods.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforces these standards indirectly through
state agencies.6 Testing results are not reported to the EPA and no centralized data source
contains this information. Instead, states report violations to the EPA on a quarterly basis.
This information is available to the public, at the water system level, through the Safe
Drinking Water Act Information System (SDWIS).
Violations are classified into three tiers. A Tier 1 violation is one with significant potential
to have serious adverse health effects on human health as a result of short term exposure.
Tier 2 violations are those with potential to have serious adverse health effects on human
health. Tier 3 includes all other violations not included in Tier 1 or Tier 2. Public water
systems must inform their customers of any violation but the required time frame varies by
tier; whereas systems have a full year to provide notice of Tier 3 violations, Tiers 1 and 2
require 24 hours and 30 days notice respectively. Table 1.1 provides additional information
regarding violation classification.
Given the salience of water quality violations and the limitations on the availability of testing
results, we use SDWIS violations data to measure water quality. The data spans the period
from 2000 to 2017. For each violation we observe characteristics of the offending water
system and details about the violation. Specifically, the data contains system characteristics
5

EPA defines a public water system (PWS) as an entity that provides water for human consumption to at
least 25 people (or at least 15 connections) for at least 60 days a year.
6
With the exception of Washington DC and Wyoming.

5

(system type7 , population served and county served) and violation information (period of
non-compliance, contaminant and tier).
We restrict the data to Tier 1 and 2 (e.g. health-based) violations and compute the total
number of new at the county-year8 . Table 1.2 presents key summary statistics. The median
number of violations in the data is zero and in a given year most counties experience at
most one violation.
The above summary statistics mask significant geographic and time variation in water quality. Figure 1.1 presents the maximum number of new violations across years for each county
in the data. This figure demonstrates that most counties experience at least one violation
across the study period, and that counties which experience two or more violations are concentrated in the South-Central region, with clusters of high violation counties throughout
the country.
1.2.2. Bottled Water and Soft Drinks Data
When households seek to avoid consuming contaminated tap water, they are likely to seek
alternatives such as bottled water and soft drinks. We rely on the Nielsen Homescan Data
(HMS) to measure purchases of these beverages. Under the Nielsen Homescan survey,
household report their retail purchases over the course of the year; participants also provide
standard demographic information about their household. This survey yields an unbalanced
panel of over 60,000 households spanning the period from 2004 to 2017. For each purchase,
we observe the product category (e.g. bottled water or soft drinks), total ounces and dollars
amount spent. We aggregate the purchase data to the household-product category-year
level.
We additionally rely on the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data (RMS), which provides an unbal7

Systems can be one of three types 1) community water system, which is a public water system that
supplies water to the same population year-round. 2) non-transient non-community water system, which is
a public water system that regularly supplies water to at least 25 of the same people at least six months
per year. 3) transient non-community water system, which is a public water system that provides water in
a place such as a gas station or campground where people do not remain for long periods of time.
8
See Appendix A.2 for details on data processing.
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anced panel of 35,000 retailers which report all transactions to Nielsen. We compute price
per gallon of bottled water at the county-year level by dividing total bottled water revenue
by total gallons sold.9
In table 1.3 we present summary statistics of households’ characteristics and consumption
of bottled water and soft drinks.
The average household in our data earns $51,565 per year, has 2 household members and
does not have children. The majority of the households are white and in roughly half of
them at least one person is college educated.
Households consume an average of 13 gallons of bottled water per year, with households in
the 95th percentile purchasing as much as 54 gallons (equivalent to consume 18 ounces of
bottled water per day). The average spending and number of purchases of bottled water
is low; the average household spends only $50 per year on 13 gallons of bottled water,
distributed over fewer than 5 purchases every year. The average price per gallon of bottled
water is $11.92; this high price is driven by the unit size for a typical purchase. Most
purchases are made for 12-16 ounce bottles, for which the price per quantity of water is
substantially higher than that of large containers.
Average consumption of soft drinks is considerably higher. Households spend roughly 3.5
times more in soft drinks, consume 1.5 times more gallons and make 3 times more purchases
of soft drinks than bottled water.
1.2.3. NHANES Data
The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) is a biannual survey
conducted by the US Center for Disease Control (CDC) to study health and nutrition patterns across a nationally representative sample of approximately 5,000 people. Of particular
interest to this study is that NHANES records participants’ consumption of plain water the
day prior to interview, specifying the quantity of tap versus bottled water. NHANES additionally reports standard demographic data; we use match NHANES data from 2010
9

See Appendix A.2 for details on data processing.
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through 2017 to estimate county-level variation in average daily water consumption based
on American Community Survey (ACS) county-level demographics.10

1.3.

Evidence of Avoidance Behavior

In this section we explore the relationship between water quality and consumption of bottled
water and soft drinks. We consider the following model:

yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t

(1.1)

Where yh,c,t represents consumption of the relevant product (bottled water, soft drinks)
by household h in county c in year t. Consumption is measured separately using each of
total ounces purchased and number of purchases. Violationsc,t is the total number of new
violations in county c and year t, Incomeh,t is the mean-centered annual income of household
h in year t. Xh,t is a vector of household characteristics, ρt and µc are year and county
fixed effects respectively.
1.3.1. Threats to Identification
In this section we address threats to the reduced form approach. First, we address whether
the treatment group, i.e. households living in counties which experience a new violation
in the survey year, and the control group (households in counties which experience no
new violations) are comparable. Second, we address whether households have information
regarding water quality which is not observed in our data, and how this outside information
would influence our analysis.
Households are assigned a weighted sum of violations across their county. For this reason,
many households are observed as experiencing a fraction of a violation, preventing a clean
division of the sample into a treated and untreated group. The median household in the
HMS lives in a county which experiences 0.85 cumulative violations across the study period.
3.2% of households live in counties which never experience a violation, and 3.7% live in
counties experiencing five or more.
10

See Appendix A.2 for details on data processing.
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First we conduct a set of balance tests to evaluate whether low and high violation groups
are demographically similar, presented in Table 1.4. The results mirror violation patterns
identified in the geographical analysis: statistically significant demographic differences exist
between low, middle, and high violation counties. Households in no-violation counties are
demographically similar across income and education to other households, but are slightly
smaller, more likely to be Black, and less likely to be Hispanic. Households in very high violation counties (five violations or more) are most demographically divergent; mean income
is approximately $3,500 lower, and these households are more likely to have less than high
school education (6 versus 4%), less likely to be college educated (25%, compared to 30%
among households in counties with fewer than five violations), and less likely to be Black
or Hispanic.
As demonstrated in Table 1.4, differences between low and high violations households are
statistically significant, typically at the 1% level, even under the inclusion of state and year
fixed effects. However, the economic magnitude of these differences requires more careful
consideration. Counties with either no violations or 5+ violations are unusual, comprising
3.4% and 3.6% of the sample respectively. A cutoff of 1 violation, by contrast, provides
a more even division of the population: 40.2% of HMS households live in counties which
experience at least one violation. In Panel B, we see that while statistically significant
differences exist with regards to household size, percent Hispanic, and high school education,
the magnitude of these differences in small. Persisting demographic differences - namely,
that households in counties with one or more violations are slightly lower income, less likely
to be Black, and less likely to be college educated - are consistent with the geographic
patterns identified in Figure 1.1. Violations are concentrated in rural areas and the central
Southwest, which are not demographically symmetric to urban areas or other regions. For
this reason, county fixed effects serve an important role in absorbing geographic variation
and any time-invariant county-level characteristics.
Differences between the treatment and control groups are relevant specifically because they
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may also influence bottled water purchases. If households in high-violation counties tend to
purchase more (or less) bottled water irrespective of violations, our results may be biased
towards zero. Figure 1.211 presents bottled water purchases over time among households
in counties experiencing at least one violation compared those experiencing fewer than
one cumulative violation. Households in high-violation counties consistently purchase more
bottled water than households in low-violation counties, regardless of whether they are in
the pre or post violation period. Notably, while the two groups’ confidence intervals overlap
substantially, the size of the gap between groups is consistent over time. This finding
suggests that high-violations households are not shifting to bottled water at a faster rate
than low-violation households. The direction of this result is consistent across cutoffs.
A likely explanation for high-violations households’ higher consumption of bottled water
is private information. If households have more information about their water system
than that which can be deduced from the violations data, then these households may have
information about compromised water quality even outside of a violations period. This
explanation would bias our results towards zero: households are engaging in avoidance
behavior, but will experience a smaller increase in bottled water purchases after a violation
if they are already relying on bottled water in the pre-period.
Lastly, we consider the possibility of pre-trends: households are able to predict, or receive
forward notice of, violations and begin engaging in avoidance behavior before the violation
is observed in the data. Figure 1.3 presents bottled water purchase behavior before and
after a county’s first observed violation year. We find no evidence of pre-trends.
1.3.2. Reduced Form Results
Table 1.5 presents the estimates of Equation (1) using total ounces purchased as our measure
of consumption. The estimates in column 3 suggest that one additional violation leads to
an increase of 50.94 ounces of bottled water purchased. Relative to the average purchases
of bottled water, this represents a 3.2% increase. We find no significant effect of violations
11

Figures 1.2 and 1.3 rely on a modified version of Keiser and Shapiro (2018)’s publicly available replication
code for event studies.
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on total ounces of soft drinks when year and county fixed effects (Column 3) are included.
In column 5 we allow the consumption effect of violations to vary with household income.
We again find no significant effect on the consumption of soft drinks. For bottled water, we
find that wealthier households react more strongly to increases in water quality violations.
A household whose income is one standard deviation higher than the average increases its
purchases of bottled water by 87.6 ounces in response to one extra water quality violation.
Relative to the average purchases of bottled water, this represents a 5.5% increase.
In table 1.6 we present the estimates of equation 1.1 using number of purchases as our
measure of consumption. The estimates again indicate the consumption of bottled water
increases with water quality violations and that consumption of soft drinks does not. The
results imply that an increase of one water quality violation leads to 1.1% more purchases
of bottled water relative to the average number of purchases.
We find modest evidence of avoidance behavior under both measures of consumption.
Household consumption of bottled water increases with water quality violations, particularly among high-income households, but households do not appear to substitute to soft
drinks. In Appendix A.3.1 we evaluate the possibility of lagged effects. The effect of current
violations remains similar in magnitude, but is not significant with the inclusion of full fixed
effects. In Appendix A.3.2 we present an extension on the reduced form equation including
interactions of education and race with violations. We again find that the interaction of
income has a significant effect on consumption of bottled water that is similar in magnitude to the one presented above. We do not find statistically significant effect of violations
interacted with either education or race on bottled water consumption.
Finally, we use our estimates from column 5 of Table 1.5 to perform a back-of-the-envelope
calculation in which we compute the increase in spending attributable to an increase from
zero violations to the level observed in the data. We find that on average these violations
increase annual spending in bottle water by $319 million dollars. This amount represents
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only 17% of the average spending of the EPA Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund
(DWSRF)12 , which is equal to $1.78 billion per year since its creation in 1996. However, this
number is not adequate to evaluate investments in water infrastructure. The back-of-theenvelope calculation does hold consumer utility constant: consumer utility is presumably
lower with violations than without them. For this reason, the back-of-the-envelope calculation is not sufficient to fully capture willingness-to-pay. To obtain such a measure we
propose a model of households’ utility as a function of violations which allows us to compute
households’ willingness-to-pay to reduce violations while holding utility constant. In the
next section we present a structural framework which allows us to compute a WTP measure
based on bottled water consumption.

1.4.

Demand Model

We construct a model of drinking water consumption which recuperates households’ willingnessto-pay for safe drinking water from observed avoidance behavior. Consider a household’s
choice between drinking one gallon of bottled water (at home) or one gallon of tap water. A household h will choose bottled water if its indirect utility of consuming bottled
TW
water (uBW
h ) exceeds its indirect utility of consuming tap water (uh ). These utilities are

constructed as follows:

W
TW
TW
W
uTh,c,t
= µTh,tW − βh vc,t
− αcTc,tW + ξ˜c,t
+ ϵTh,c,t

uBW
h,c,t

=

µBW
h,t

−

BW
βh vc,t

−

αcBW
c,t

(1.2)

BW
+ ξ˜c,t
+ ϵBW
h,c,t

Where vc,t is water quality measured in violations, cc,t is the cost per gallon of water, ξ˜c,t
is an unobserved product characteristic and ϵh,c,t is a household level shock that follows a
extreme value type-I distribution. Our model relies on the following assumptions:
A1: Bottled water has zero violations against EPA standards.13
12
13

DWSRF Reference
This assumption does not imply that the utility of bottle water is the same as that of tap water with zero
water quality violations. We allow for state and year differences in utility between these two alternatives.

12

BW
BW
BW
A2: The cost per gallon of bottled water is given by cBW
c,t = pc,t + rc,t , where pc,t is
BW comprises all other monetary costs,
the price per gallon of bottled water and rc,t

such as transportation, associated with purchasing one gallon of bottled water. This
assumption on the functional form of the cost of bottled water allows us to identify
BW as long as we have variation in price per gallon pBW that
α without observing rc,t
c,t
BW . These other unobserved monetary cost will then be absorved
is independent of rc,t

into the unobserved product characteristic. In Section 1.4.2 we further discuss instruBW
mentation for the pc,t . For the remainder of the paper, we replace cBW
c,t with pc,t and
BW = ξ˜BW + αr BW .
let ξc,t
c,t
c,t

A3: The cost per gallon of tap water is zero14 .
A4: The household-specific taste parameter βh is a function of the household’s income.
Specifically, we assume βh = β + θmh,t . Where, mh,t is the household’s income.
Given these assumptions, a household will only choose bottled water over tap water if

BW
BW
BW
TW
TW
TW
TW
µBW
h,t − αpc,t + ξc,t + ϵh,c,t ≥ µh,t − βh vc,t + ξc,t + ϵh,c,t

(1.3)

TW
TW
BW
BW
TW
BW
TW
⇒ µBW
h,t − µh,t + βh vc,t − αpc,t + ξc,t − ξc,t + ϵh,c,t ≥ ϵh,c,t

We then redefine the utility of bottled water to be

TW
BW
BW
uBW
h,c,t = µh,t + βh vc,t − αpc,t + ξc,t + ϵh,c,t

(1.4)

W = ϵT W . From this specification we obtain the
and the utility of tap water to be uTh,c,t
h,c,t
14

An average U.S. family of four consumes 100 gallons per person per day and pays $72.93 per month for
water as of 2019, implying an average price per gallon of $0.006. The average price of a one-gallon bottle
of water is more than 200 times higher at $1.22.(Tiseo (2021), Boesler (2013)). The price per gallon of
smaller water bottles is considerably higher. Additionally, drinking water comprises less than 1% of tap
water consumption on average; given that water bills likely include some fixed costs, the marginal price per
gallon of drinking water is even closer to zero (WaterTalks (2019)).
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marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a reduction of one water quality violation, given
by βh /α.
1.4.1. Estimation
The model implies that the share of households that choose a gallon of bottled water over
tap water is:

sc,t =

T W − αpBW + ξ )
exp(µh,t + βh vc,t
c,t
c,t
BW
T
W
1 + exp(µh,t + βh vc,t − αpc,t + ξc,t )

(1.5)

Notice that this probability depends on household characteristics, violations, and price,
but not on any gallon-specific variables. Therefore, the model predicts that households
will choose the same source of drinking water at home for every gallon they consume,
which implies that we can estimate the model using household-level decisions of water
source (bottled vs tap) instead of unobserved gallon-level decisions. We therefore classify
households as bottled or tap water consumers and compute the share of bottled water
households at the county-year level. Using these market shares and equation (1.5) we can
estimate the model by fitting the parameters to match the shares predicted from the reduced
form exercise.
1.4.2. Identification
To address potential endogeneity of prices, we follow the approach introduced by Hausman
(2008) and applied frequently in the industrial organization literature15 in which a product’s
price in other markets serve as an instrument for price in the selected market. In this
application, we instrument pc,t using the average of pc′ ,t across all other counties in state s
where county c is located in year y.
1.4.3. Model Results
In this section we present the results of our demand model. As previously mentioned,
our estimation strategy requires the classification of households into either bottled water
15

For example, Nevo (2001), DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) and Ghose and Han (2014)
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or tap water consumers. We classify households based on their observed consumption of
bottled water. Specifically, we set an annual household bottled water consumption cutoff
such that all households below the cutoff are classified as tap water consumers, and all
households above it as bottled water consumers. Because the selection of a particular cutoff
is subjective, we define cutoffs based on the distribution of positive consumption of bottled
water and test the model under a range of cutoffs: we present the results using cutoffs
points of the 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th and 60th percentile of the distribution.
Table 1.7 presents the results of our demand model estimation. We emphasize three key
aspects of these results. First, regardless of cutoff point, all point estimates for price and
violations are of the expected sign: price (α) decreases utility of bottled water while violations (β) increases it. Second, our results indicate that household income exacerbates the
effect of violations on utility for bottled water. Third, our estimates are stable across the
selection of cutoffs, although the results are less precise under stricter cutoffs.
To interpret our estimates, we compute marginal willingness to pay for an improvement of
one standard deviation in water quality for the average household within varying income
brackets. The equation is as follows:

β̂ + θ̂ × Income
βˆh
=
× Std. Dev. Violations.
α̂
α̂

(1.6)

In Figure 1.4 we plot MWTP for all six cutoffs. For a household with an income of $50,000,
MWTP ranges from $0.5 to $2.3. This represents a 4.2% to 19.3% increase over the average price per gallon in our data. Figure 1.4 additionally demonstrates that income has a
significant effect on MWTP. Given our estimates, based on a cutoff of the 30th percentile, a
household with an income of $85,000 is willing to pay $5.0 or 180% more than a household
with an income of $50,000.16
16

In Appendix A.3.2 we present the same figure with the confidence intervals for each cutoff.
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1.4.4. Model’s Interpretation
Our model’s estimate of willingness-to-pay for safe drinking water is likely to be only a
lower bound for a variety of reasons:
1. Imperfect information: Even if households only care about the standards set by the
EPA, they might not be aware of all relevant water quality violations. In this case,
households with a positive WTP may not engage in avoidance behavior due to imperfect information. Our model will not be able to capture this component of willingnessto-pay because we do not observe households’ awareness levels.
2. Alternatives to bottled and tap water: Our model assumes that households’ only alternative to tap water is bottled water. This assumption is motivated by our reduced
form results presented in section 1.3. However, households may engage in avoidance behavior outside the scope of retail beverage purchases, including boiling water,
purchasing water delivery services or water filtration systems, or even moving to a
different location. These behaviors reflect positive WTP for clean water but are not
observed in our analysis.
3. Measurement error in water quality: Our model assumes that households’ perception
of water quality is based only on the number of water quality violations. As discussed
above and demonstrated in Figure 1.2, this is likely not the case. Even in the absence of
an enumerated violation, households may perceive water to be unsafe to drink based on
water taste, housing characteristics, or institutional distrust. In this case households
would avoid tap water in the absence of violations, which reflects a willingness to pay
for water quality that will not be captured in our estimates.

1.5.

Counterfactual Exercises

In this section we use our demand model estimates to evaluate investments in drinking
water infrastructure. Specifically, we rely on our estimates based on the 6.1 gallon (30th
percentile) cutoff in the counterfactual exercises below.
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1.5.1. Willingness-to-pay To Reach A Zero Violations Scenario
In our first counterfactual exercise, we evaluate whether households’ willingness-to-pay justifies future investments in drinking water infrastructure improvements. Specifically, we
compute the aggregate WTP across all US households to go from the observed level of
violations to a case of zero water quality violations.
Consider county c in year y. Let the number of water quality violations be vc,t , the county’s
population be Nc,t and the average household’s annual consumption of drinking water at
home be Wc,t , in gallons. Then, given the county’s average household income (mc,t ) we can
compute the county’s aggregate WTP for a reduction of vc,t violations using the following
expression:

Aggregate WTPc,t (vc,t ) =

β̂ + θ̂ × mc,t
× vc,t × Nc,t × Wc,t .
α̂

(1.7)

Finally, we sum over all counties and years to obtain a national willingness-to-pay to achieve
zero water quality violations. We find that in the period spanning 2000 to 2017, the national
WTP totaled $285.4 billion, with a 95% confidence interval of $260.2 to $308.9 billion. This
implies that an average annual national WTP of $15.9 billion.
To compare this estimated benefit against estimated costs, we first consider the EPA Drinking Water State Revolving Loan Fund (DWSRF)17 , which is the main source of federal
support for investments in safe drinking water provision. This fund has provided $41.1
billion in various forms of financial assistance since its creation in 1996. Through 2019 the
fund has invested on average $1.78 billion per year; our WTP estimates are approximately
9 times the size of the fund’s annual budget.
The recently approved infrastructure bill increases the DWSRF budget for the next five
years by $20 billion and adds another $15 billion specifically for the replacement of lead
17

DWSRF Reference
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service line replacement projects,18 equivalent to an additional $7 billion per year. Even
under this increase, our estimated benefits surpass the DWSRF budget by a large margin.
The EPA, however, recognizes that the current levels of investments are not sufficient to
cover the US water infrastructure needs. In its latest assessment of public water system
infrastructure the agency estimated that, for the next 20 years, a $345.1 billion budget is
necessary to rehabilitate, replace, and upgrade existing infrastructure19 . This total translates to an annual cost of $17.2 billion, which is higher but on the same order of magnitude
as our estimated WTP of $15.9 billion.
1.5.1.1. Increases In Water Bills And Comparison To Survey-Based WTP Estimates
In this section we compare our counterfactual willingness-to-pay against estimates in the
existing contingent variation (CV) literature. Under CV methodology, survey participants
are directly asked to provide their own WTP. Chatterjee et al. (2017), for example, asks
survey participants: How much of an increase in your monthly water bill would you be
willing to pay to improve the quality of your water?. These estimates will, therefore, depend
on survey participants’ baseline drinking water quality, and do not specify a target level of
improvement.
The CV literature typically gauges WTP in terms of potential increases in monthly water
bills. Table 1.8 summarizes these studies’ locations and findings. We consider three United
States studies and one study using data from 10 OECD countries.
To compare our estimates to the literature, we translate our calculated aggregate WTP to
increases in households water bills. To do so, we propose a water bill increase which depends only on households’ willingness-to-pay, not their exposure to water quality violations.
Specifically, the per-person increase in monthly water bills in county c and year y is given
by:
18
19

Volcovici (2021), EPA (2021)
EPA (2018)

18

X
WTPc,t
×
Aggregate WTPc′ ,t (vc′ ,t )
c′ WTPc′ ,t × Populationc′ ,t
c′

Monthly Increase in Water Billc,t = P

where, WTPc,t =

β̂ + θ̂ × mc,t
.
α̂
(1.8)

Where Aggregate WTPc,t (vc,t ) is the same as in equation 1.7. In Figure 1.5 we present
these increases in the monthly water bill for a two-person household in 2017. The median
monthly increase is $6.90, with some households paying as much as $19.60 and as little as
$3.20.
Alternatively, we propose a water bill increase which depends only on households’ exposure
to water quality violations over the years in our sample. Specifically, the per person increase
in monthly water bills in county c and year y is given by

PT

Monthly Increase in Water Billc =

t=1 Aggregate

T

WTPc,t (vc,t )

.

(1.9)

In Figure 1.6 we present these monthly water bill increases for a two-person household in
2017. The median increase monthly increase is $3.40, with some households paying as much
as $179.30 and as little as $0.
We find that monthly increases in water bills implied by estimated WTP vary significantly
depending on households’ exposure to poor water quality as well as with household income.
This variation is not captured by the existing contingent valuation literature, in which
studies typically evaluates WTP in a narrow setting. We additionally demonstrate that
WTP can be significantly higher than the levels suggested by the current literature when
households are exposed to poor drinking water quality and/or are high-income.
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1.5.2. Evaluating Annual Public Spending On Water Utilities
In this counterfactual we compare willingness-to-pay for safe drinking water against annual water infrastructure investment costs. We first note that, in the absence of these
investments, water quality will decrease considerably. We therefore consider a scenario in
which drinking water infrastructure degrades to a point at which households are exposed
to extreme violation levels.
Specifically, we consider two cases. First, we consider a case in which all US households are
exposed to the level of violations observed in Flint, MI during the peak of its water crisis.
Second, we consider a case in which all water utilities reach the 95th percentile of violations
observed in the data.
We use Equation 1.7 to compute aggregate WTP for reducing violations from these crisis
scenarios to zero. We find that in these extreme cases, US households’ WTP to restore safe
drinking water access is $160.7 billion per year under a Flint, MI scenario and $159.6 billion
per year under a 95th percentile case, with 95% confidence intervals of [$148.6, $173.6]
billion and [$147.3, $172.2], respectively.
These figures are comparable to total annual public spending on water utilities, which the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates to be $113.03 billion in 2017. This comparison suggests that US households’ value for access to safe drinking water justifies current
spending, and potentially justifies much larger investments in water infrastructure.

1.6.

Conclusion

In this paper we estimate households’ willingness-to-pay for quality drinking water. To
do so we rely on households’ observed avoidance behavior and use violations against EPA
drinking water standards to measure quality at the county-year level. We first show that
households react to violations by increasing their consumption of bottled water. These
increases are modest and positively related to household income. We build on these findings
to propose and estimate a discrete choice model of drinking water consumption. From the
model we compute a marginal willingness-to-pay (MWTP) for improvements in drinking
20

water quality, which we find to be increasing in household income. Lastly, we aggregate
out MWTP estimates to the country-year level under two counterfactual scenarios to gauge
whether households’ valuation for water quality is comparable to the cost of maintaining
and improving water infrastructure. We find that aggregate WTP exceeds the historical
DWSRF budget and is comparable to, or potentially much higher than, EPA estimates of
necessary investment to replace, rehabilitate and upgrade existing water infrastructure.
Together our results suggest that current and proposed drinking water infrastructure spending is considerably below households’ willingness-to-pay. This finding holds even under the
recent increase in infrastructure investment passed by the Biden administration. Put plainly,
US households clearly value access to drinking water enough to justify increased spending to
tackle the current drinking water crisis and prevent a further decline drinking water quality.
For reasons previously discussed, we interpret our findings as a likely underestimate of
households’ WTP for drinking water quality. Future research would improve upon our
estimations with more precise data regarding households’ avoidance behavior. Additionally
and importantly, future work can improve upon these estimates using alternative measures
of water quality as well as households’ perception of water quality. This project uses the
best known measure of drinking water quality at the national level, but efforts are improving
to aggregate other measures of quality to the national level. Measuring WTP with a myriad
of household-level measures (utility testing results, household perceptions of quality, etc)
would be an important contribution to this literature.
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1.7.

Tables
Table 1.1: Types Of Violations To EPA Drinking Water Standards

Tier 1

First notice

Substances

Example

24 hours

E. coli, nitrate or nitrite, chlo-

Infants drinking water contain-

rine dioxide, turbidity

ing excess nitrate could become
seriously ill and, if untreated,
may die.

Tier 2

30 days

All other MCLs

Presence of coliform bacteria.
Generally not harmful themselves, but could indicate problems with treatment or distribution system.

Tier 3

1 year

Failure to comply with a testing

System failed to collect the cor-

procedure or operation under a

rect number of drinking water

exemption

samples

Table 1.2: Summary Statistics Water Quality Violations

Total Violations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

95th p.

Max.

0.23

0.59

0.00

1.13

11.00

Notes: Numbers are based on the total number of new Tier 1 and 2 violations at the county-year weighted
by exposed population.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics Bottled Water and Soda Consumption
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

95th p.

Household Characteristics
Household Income

51565

23260

2500

85000

Household Size

2.484

1.313

1

5

Non White

0.178

0.382

0

1

College Educated

0.504

0.5

0

1

Presence of Children

0.277

0.445

0

1

Bottled Water
$ Spent

48.979

276.528

0

178.20

Gallons Bought

12.937

26.297

0

53.87

# Purchases

4.668

7.343

1

16.00

Price per Gall.

11.92

7.69

1.85

26.05

Soft Drinks
$ Spent

172.45

561.376

0

721.01

Gallons Bought

18.049

35.22

0

75.67

# Purchases

12.685

21.138

1

48.00

Notes: Summary statistics computed using Nielsen’s Homescan and Retail Scanner data from 2006 to 2017.

Table 1.5: Consumption Regressions - Total Ounces Purchased
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

145.92***

155.95***

46.47**

165.23***

50.94***

-

-

-

2.411***

1.572*

242.71***

194.69***

23.16

189.75***

21.52

-

-

-

-1.286

-0.579

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Total New Violations
Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks
Total New Violations
Income (in 1000s) X Violations

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is ounces of bottled water or ounces of soft drinks.
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Table 1.4: Balance Tests

Panel A
Income
HH Size
Black
Hispanic
Less than
High School
College +
Panel B
Income
HH Size
Black
Hispanic
Less than
High School
College +
Panel C
Income
HH Size
Black
Hispanic
Less than
High School
College +

Diff:

Diff:
Year FE

Diff:
Year &
State FE

-0.016
0.088***
-0.081***
0.022***

-0.063
0.088***
-0.081***
0.022***

-0.024
0.115***
-0.071***
0.010***

0.000
0.001

0.000
0.000

0.007**
0.006

-1.206***
0.027***
-0.009***
0.000

-1.206***
0.027***
-0.009***
0.000

-0.508***
0.032***
-0.009***
0.007***

Mean
No Violations
51.66
2.38
0.18
0.04

Mean
Violations
51.65
2.46
0.10
0.06

0.04
0.30
< 1 Violations
52.13
2.45
0.11
0.06

0.04
0.30
1+ Violations
50.93
2.48
0.10
0.06

0.04
0.31
< 5 Violations
51.77
2.46
0.10
0.06

0.04
0.28
5+ Violations
48.28
2.53
0.07
0.04

0.006***
-0.028***

0.006***
-0.028***

0.004***
-0.022***

-3.493***
0.072***
-0.034***
-0.022***

-3.476***
0.071***
-0.034***
-0.022***

-2.655***
0.040*
-0.033***
-0.007**

0.04
0.30

0.06
0.25

0.023***
-0.056***

0.023***
-0.056***

0.018***
-0.046***

Income is measured in 1000’s. Statistics are calculated over the unweighted Nielsen HMS sample. Violations
are observed at the county-year level, demographics are by household. Differences are measured first using
no fixed effects, then using year FE, then year and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water
Total New Violations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.23***

0.24***

0.07*

0.26***

0.08**

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

1.45***

1.19***

0.13

1.15***

0.1

-

-

-

-0.011

-0.009

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks
Total New Violations
Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.

Table 1.7: Demand Model Results
Cutoff

α

β

θ

10th p. = 1.1 gal

-0.0133***

0.038**

0.0039**

20th p. = 2.2 gal

-0.0136***

0.0589***

0.0028**

30th p. = 3.8 gal

-0.0116***

0.0684***

0.0029**

40th p. = 6.1 gal

-0.0118***

0.0794***

0.0025*

50th p. = 9.2 gal

-0.0124***

0.0928***

0.0024*

60th p. = 13.7 gal

-0.0143***

0.1028***

0.0036**

p-value: ***: < 0.01, **: < 0.05, *: < 0.1
We omit our estimate of µh,y which includes income,
and year and state fixed effects.
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Table 1.8: Literature Estimating WTP in Developed Economies Using Contingent
Variation Methods
Paper

Setting

Survey Year

Average
(Change
Bill)

Jordan and Elnagheeb

Georgia (USA)

1991

$5.49

Whitehead (2006)

Neuse River Basin, NC

1998

$1.75

Beaumais et al. (2014)

10 OECD countries

2008

$5.32

Chatterjee et al. (2017)

Jacksonville, FL

2016

$6.22

(1993)

1.8.

Figures

Figure 1.1: Maximum Number of New Violations
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WTP
in

Water

Figure 1.2: Bottled Water Purchase Behavior
Figure 1.3: Bottled Water Purchase Behavior - Years to First Violation

Figure 1.4: MWTP for a one standard deviation improvement in water quality, by income.
β̂ + θ̂ × Income
Notes: MWTP is given by
× Std. Dev. Violations. Cutoffs are used to classify households
α̂
into bottled or tap water consumers and each provides a different point estimate of β, α, θ.
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Figure 1.5: Monthly increase in water bill for a household of two, by county in 2017
Notes: Monthly water bill increase for a two-person household assuming households pay based only on their
WTP. Per capita increase is given by Equation 1.8.
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Figure 1.6: Monthly increase in water bill for a household of two, by county
Notes: Monthly water bill increase for a two-person household assuming households pay based on their
WTP and exposure to violations. Per-capita increase is given by Monthly Increase in Water Billc =
PT
Aggregate WTPc,t (vc,t )
t=1
.
T
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CHAPTER 2 : Estimating Willingness-to-Pay for Water Quality in the US
2.1.

Introduction

The transition towards renewable energy in the United States has been filled with challenges.
The world is lagging behind with the necessary climate action to keep the global average
temperature increase below 2 degrees Celsius (Lebling et al., 2020) and any solution must
include the U.S. As the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases it is crucial that the
country accelerates its use of renewable energy sources (Friedrich et al., 2020). However,
the fiscal burden of the green energy transition would be lower—and the political feasibility
would be higher—if the U.S. were to implement cost-effective policies.
Of all U.S. policies aimed at increasing renewable energy generation, Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPSs) have been some of the most influential. RPSs are state government mandates that require electric utility companies to source a certain amount of the electricity they
sell from renewable energy sources. Utility companies comply with the RPS by purchasing
renewable energy certificates (RECs) from eligible renewable energy producers. The price
of these credits is determined by demand and supply and reflects the cost of compliance
with the RPS. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, these policies are
associated with over 50% of the increase in renewable energy in the United States since
the beginning of the 2000s (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020), and they will
almost certainly continue to be a critical tool to achieve the country’s renewable energy
goals. State-level RPSs are ubiquitous—30 states and the District of Columbia have an
RPS and multiple states have recently set increasingly ambitious RPS targets. For example, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Nevada and New Jersey have targets that require
at least 50% of electricity generation to come from renewable sources by 2030. Despite this
statewide action a federal renewable energy standard appears elusive given the status quo
in Washington DC. Studying the design of state RPS policies is therefore politically relevant and economically important, yet the cost-effectiveness of RPS policy design is largely
understudied.
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Economic theory suggests that portfolio standards are most cost-effective if states adopt a
single market and impose only a final generation target (or a sequence of targets set for
multi-year time intervals) but no interim annual targets. However, political reality and
moral hazard may give governments reasons to deviate from this prescription. In practice,
factors not related to the cost efficiency of the policy often influence a state’s RPS design. For example, states sometimes require the RPS requirement to be met with in-state
renewable energy to localize the economic benefits of RPSs, such as job creation, or to
improve local air quality (Lyon and Yin, 2010). For example, Pennsylvania credited solar
projects in other states until 2017, but then Governor Wolf signed into law Act 40, a bipartisan bill that required solar-credited projects to be built in Pennsylvania to prevent solar
jobs moving elsewhere (PennFuture, 2018; PA Department of Environmental Protection,
2018). In addition, many states use interim annual targets that force solar adoption to deviate from its unconstrained path, driven by concerns that back-loaded installations trigger
moral hazard. For example, without interim targets, compliance entities may under-procure
renewable energy and be unable to meet a final target obligation (Heeter et al., 2019). This
subsequently creates strong incentives to lobby the regulators for laxer targets when the
final date approaches. In extreme cases, utilities might declare bankruptcy before meeting
their final target. Finally, a state’s political inclination is predictive of the stringency of
RPS targets and whether or not a state has an RPS at all (Fowler and Breen, 2013; Huang
et al., 2007).
In this paper, we study how alternative RPS policy designs affect the cost of implementing
renewable energy targets. We focus on three key aspects of RPS rules: the stringency of
the RPS target, interim annual targets, and geographic trading restrictions. We quantify
the costs of these political constraints.
To calculate the cost of implementing an RPS under a specific set of rules, we must have
a sense of the cost of increasing renewable energy generation across different sources and
states, and over time. However, building a strategy to do so that is suitable for the multiple
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renewable energy sources included in most states’ RPSs is a challenging task. These sources
have vastly different installation processes, cost structures, and data availability. Therefore,
we focus on solar RPSs, also known as solar carve-outs, which require a fraction of a state’s
RPS goal to be fulfilled exclusively with solar energy. The corresponding compliance credits
are known as solar renewable energy credits (SRECs). We develop a framework and collect
the necessary data to apply that framework across several regions to estimate solar RPS
implementation costs.
The first challenge we face is to estimate state-level solar supply curves. We note that
solar markets do not comprise an entire state, and are instead smaller regions where solar
installers and consumers interact to determine equilibrium quantities and prices (Gillingham
et al., 2016). Our strategy, therefore, begins by estimating the supply curve in these smaller
markets using an instrumental variables approach. This exploits the disaggregate nature of
our installation-level data and allows us to capture within-state differences in installation
costs.1 We then aggregate to the state level.
To accomplish this we conjecture that the market-level solar supply curves become steep
at levels of installations that substantially exceed current activity, while the supply curve
moves down over time as solar technology improves. We therefore assume that each market
has an annual limit on new installations. Market-level differences in the slope of the supply
curve, coupled with our assumption on a capacity limit, determine the convexity of the
state’s supply curve (which is an aggregate of the various market-level supply curves).
We present all of our results using alternative assumptions on markets’ capacity limits to
understand how our results vary with these assumptions. Then, we exploit the fact that, in
a well-functioning market, at the state-year level the cost of the marginal system necessary
to comply with the solar RPS must be equal to the benefits that this marginal solar system
receives. Here, the benefits include the expected electricity savings, rebates, SRECs and
1

Our supply curve is specified in terms of solar capacity in megawatts (MW) whereas RPSs are usually
generation targets in megawatt hours (MWh). Later in the paper we convert generation targets into solar
capacity needed to reach these targets.
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other federal and state-level incentives. We use this assumption to identify the intercept of
a state’s solar supply curve. Following this approach we are able to obtain state-year level
solar supply curves.
Next, we present a theoretical framework where a social planner minimizes the cost of
reaching a given RPS target by allocating solar installations across states and years subject
to each state’s interim annual targets and geographic trading rules. We solve the planner’s
problem under different counterfactual scenarios using our estimated solar supply curves.
First, we consider historically observed solar RPSs for seven U.S. states during the period of
2015 to 2019 and solve for the cost-minimizing allocation under different scenarios. When we
compare a scenario with both interim targets and restrictions on cross-state trading to one
with no restrictions, we find that installations in the Northeast would have been 60% lower
and installations in the Southwest would have increased by 250%. In addition, we find that
in the absence of restrictions, the planner chooses to back-load installations as the cost of
solar decreases (exogenously) over time. Without annual targets almost 90% of installations
occur in the last two years. With annual targets, these two years account for only 42% of
solar installations. This shows that geographic and temporal restrictions lead to costinefficient allocations of solar capacity. Eliminating interim schedules (trading restrictions)
would have reduced the cost of reaching the RPS target by 32% (24%). Eliminating all
restrictions would have reduced the cost of reaching the RPS target by 46%.
We then consider how these cost inefficiencies change as the RPS targets become more
ambitious. Relative to the historically observed solar RPSs, we double the solar RPS state
targets but maintain the (scaled-up) interim targets and geographic trading restrictions that
we observe in the data. In this case, removing restrictions decreases the cost of implementing
the solar RPS even more. Eliminating either interim targets or geographic trading rules
leads to cost reductions of 75% and 76% relative to the case with both types of restrictions,
respectively. Implementing the RPS without any restrictions decreases the cost by 81%. We
also consider even more ambitious RPS targets and find that, without restrictions, the RPS
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target can be more than four times higher than the observed target without a significant
increase in the cost per gigawatt (GW). This, however, is not possible if one imposes either
geographic trading rules or interim annual targets.
In our other counterfactuals, we consider scenarios that deviate from the historically observed RPS rules and targets. We propose simple RPS schedules that policy makers might
consider when designing their RPSs. Specifically, we consider a linearly increasing schedule
where new installation requirements are the same every year and an accelerating schedule,
where the amount to be installed increases annually. We find that the linearly increasing
and the observed schedules are considerably more expensive than the scenario without interim targets, but the accelerating schedule reduces RPS implementation costs significantly
(but can still be considerably more expensive than the case with no interim targets). This
suggests that policy makers might have to anticipate changes in the cost curves of solar
energy due to technological change and other supply side conditions, and allow for some
degree of back-loading by setting accelerating targets, using multi-year compliance periods,
or allowing for banking and borrowing of renewable energy credits.
Finally, in our last counterfactual, we consider how our results depend on the realized
choices of solar RPS targets by the U.S. states from 2015 to 2019. We simulate a wide
range of ‘what-if’ scenarios that consider what would have happened had states chosen
different targets. We calculate and hold fixed the total RPS requirement added across the
different states and generate random state allocations that add up to the same overall target.
We then compute the cost inefficiencies associated with geographic trading restrictions for
each of these potential allocations of RPS targets. This analysis shows a moderately wide
distribution of cost inefficiencies. The median increase in cost due to geographic trading
restrictions across all the potential allocations we consider is 14%. We also find that as
the nationwide RPS target increases the vast majority of allocations induce severe cost
inefficiencies. For an RPS 50% larger than the actual policy, imposing trading restrictions
increases the cost of implementation by more than 80% for 75% percent of the potential
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allocations. This suggests that as the requirements for renewable energy increase, isolated
state mandates can dramatically increase the cost of adding solar capacity for almost all
potential allocation of installations across states. This is another reason in favor of making
trading rules more flexible.
Our counterfactuals suggest that a combination of cross-state trading, back-loaded targets,
and the use of banking and borrowing of SRECs can mitigate the escalating costs of solar
RPSs. While we focus on solar carve-outs, the qualitative insights apply to the design
of RPSs more generally. Our results contribute to the economics literature on renewable
energy policy. A large body of research provides cost-benefit analyses of increased renewable
energy generation conditional on existing policies (Gowrisankaran et al., 2016; Cullen, 2013;
Joskow, 2011), with some work focusing on existing renewable portfolio standards (Palmer
and Burtraw, 2004, 2005; Fischer and Newell, 2008; Fischer, 2009; Heeter et al., 2014;
Upton Jr. and Snyder, 2017; Greenstone and Nath, 2020). To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to consider alternative RPS designs and to quantify the costs of
interim targets and geographic trading restrictions, yielding insights for more cost-effective
RPS policy design. While there are political costs of allowing for geographic trading given
its potentially adverse local solar-sector employment effects, and moral hazard costs of
abolishing interim annual targets, our analysis puts an ‘efficiency price tag’ on these other
objectives and concerns.
Our paper builds on the theoretical literature on RPS design (del Río, 2005; Söderholm,
2008). We contribute to this research by taking these theoretical frameworks to the data.
We also contribute to the literature on solar photovoltaic markets. Several papers in this
literature have focused on the demand side (De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Hughes and
Podolefsky, 2015; Burr, 2016; Gillingham et al., 2016) and a few have studied learning-bydoing on the supply side (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2019; Gerarden, 2021; van Benthem
et al., 2008; Dorsey, 2020). Our paper contributes to this literature by proposing and
estimating a method to recover state-level solar supply curves.
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We believe these results to be of interest to both economists and policymakers as they highlight the tradeoffs between economic efficiency and other political or economic objectives.
The significant cost reductions that we document from lifting SREC trade restrictions will
be even larger following the introduction of a federal RPS, which could eventually become
political reality given the popularity of RPS policies across states of different political colors.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces renewable portfolio standards
and explains the main differences in RPSs across states, including solar carve-outs. Section
2.3 presents our strategy to estimate state-level solar supply curves. Section 2.4 presents
the problem a planner faces when deciding how to satisfy an RPS given states’ solar supply
curves, RPS targets, interim targets and trading restrictions. We then use our estimated
state-level supply curves to solve the planner’s problem for different sets of rules and RPS
targets in order to evaluate various alternative policy designs. Section 2.5 concludes.

2.2.

Renewable Portfolio Standards

Renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) are state government mandates that require electric
utility companies to source a certain amount of the electricity they sell from renewable
energy sources. RPSs are usually set in terms of a percentage of total electricity sales that
must be achieved with renewable energy sources in some target year.2 Any producer of green
power (e.g., a utility owning renewable capacity, an independent wind energy developer, or a
residential solar customer) receives a renewable energy certificate (REC) for each megawatt
hour produced. Utilities can then either purchase these credits or self-generate renewable
energy to produce their own credits. Table 2.1 presents all of the states that have an RPS
in place, and highlights the large differences between programs.
Utilities may face two main constraints when fulfilling the RPS:
Interim annual targets: States often face interim goals that increase progressively towards a terminal target that is usually set five or ten years ahead. The RPS targets in
New Jersey, for example, require 14% renewables by 2019, 16% by 2020, and 21% by 2021,
2

Some exceptions, like Iowa and Texas, set their goals in terms of installed capacity (in MW).
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eventually ramping up to 50% by 2030 (Database of State Incentives for Renewables and
Efficiency, 2021d). While most states have set annual interim targets on a path towards
meeting their final RPS goal, it is also quite common to specify such interim targets once
every 2, 3 4 or 5 years. In addition, most states allow for banking of renewable energy
credits.3 This allows utilities to flexibly comply with the interim targets by choosing their
own multiple-year time path towards compliance.
Geographic trading restrictions: Utilities can only use RECs produced within their
state or regional transmission organization to comply with the RPS. For example, RECs
produced in the 13 states that are part of the PJM Interconnection4 , a regional transmission
organization in the U.S. Northeast, can be used to comply with Pennsylvania’s RPS.
States’ RPS requirements can be met with multiple different sources of renewable energy
and are sometimes called Tier/Class 1 requirements. In addition, states might also have a
solar energy portfolio standard, also known as a solar carve-out. A solar carve-out requires
a fraction of the RPS goal to be fulfilled exclusively with solar energy. In states with solar
carve-outs utilities also purchase or generate solar RECs (SRECs). Figure 2.1 (top) presents
a map of states that currently have an RPS or solar carve-out. Additionally, in Figure 2.1
(bottom) we present a measure of states’ solar resource5 , and also highlight the borders of
states with a solar carve-out. This map shows that the majority of states with a solar RPS
are not in regions with high solar resource, hinting at a potential cost-inefficient allocation
of solar installations. Table 2.2 presents the annual solar carve-out targets, as a percentage
of total electricity sales, and geographic trading rules for the states with a solar carve-out
3

It is common to have a certificate lifetime of 3 years (Delaware, New Hampshire, Missouri), however 4
years (New Mexico) and 5 years (New Jersey) also occur. In rare cases, such as Arizona, certificates
(created after 1997) never expire, and can be retired at any point. We are not aware of any states that
allow for long-term borrowing, i.e., under-complying in the short run under the condition of making up for
the shortfall in future years. By spacing out interim targets over multiple years, several states implicitly
allow for short-run borrowing within such a compliance period. One example is California, which allows for
short-run borrowing through interim annual RPS targets with three-year compliance periods (CA Public
Utilities Commission, 2022).
4
These states are Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington DC and West Virginia.
5
See Section 2.3.2 for a detailed explanation of this measure.
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in the period of 2015 to 2019.
Although RECs and SRECs both represent a megawatt hour of renewable energy, there are
often different rules for how the two types of certificates can be used for compliance. For
example, the majority of states with solar carve-outs require that the SRECs be produced
within state. There are exceptions, such as New Hampshire, which allows SRECs from all of
New England. Pennsylvania allowed SRECs from out of state until an amendment in 2017,
which restricted the eligibility to only in-state SRECs. The motivation for this was largely
the fact that as one of the only states that had open borders, a majority of Pennsylvania’s
solar credits were being generated in other states. Further, Pennsylvania was ranked 19th
in the Solar Jobs Report of that year (The Solar Foundation, 2017), which motivated local
lawmakers to find ways to incentivize more solar installations in Pennsylvania.
The price of RECs and SRECs is determined by supply and demand, and reflects the shadow
cost of complying with the RPS. REC revenues increase the profitability of new renewable
energy projects enough to ensure that there are sufficient certificates in the market to satisfy
the utilities’ demand. REC prices will increase until the revenue of the marginal project
necessary to comply with the state’s RPS equals the project’s costs. State conditions like
a steep marginal cost of renewable energy, or a highly ambitious RPS target, can lead to a
high shadow cost of compliance, which is reflected in high REC prices. Therefore, differences
in the price of renewable energy certificates across states and time indicate differences in
the cost of compliance.
Figure 2.2 presents the SREC prices for eight states with a solar carve-out for the period
of 2010 to 2019. The graph illustrates how the cost of complying with the states’ solar
RPS varies significantly across time and states. In several states, the SREC price is an
order of magnitude above wholesale power prices (typically in the $30-50 per MWh range),
while SREC prices in other states are close to zero. This motivates the research question of
this paper—the large dispersion in SREC prices across states and over time suggests that
economic gains could be realized from equating the marginal cost of compliance in space
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and time.6
Although RPSs are the focus of this paper, they are not the only incentive program for
renewable energy. Another important policy is the federal solar Investment Tax Credit
(ITC). This program was implemented in 2006, and provides up to a 30% tax credit for
solar systems, on both residential and commercial properties (Pless and van Benthem, 2019).
Some states have also implemented state specific rebates. For example, in Maryland, the
Residential Clean Energy Rebate Program offers monetary incentives to encourage the
installation of residential solar water heating, solar photovoltaics, and geothermal heat
pumps. Solar PV installations can receive a transfer of up to $1000 per installation. Finally,
most states have net metering policies. Households that generate electricity, for instance
through solar panels on their roofs, can sell the excess electricity that they do not consume
back to the grid. In the following sections, when we calculate the benefits of installing a
solar panel, we incorporate not only SREC sales, but all benefits that a household would
receive from their solar panels, including those mentioned above.

2.3.

Supply Curve Estimation

In this section we present our strategy for estimating state-level solar supply curves. We have
in mind supply curves that are upward sloping within a given year and shift down over time
as solar technology improves. Figure 2.3 illustrates this for two states in a given calendar
year. The cost of increasing solar capacity in state A rises faster than in state B. To ensure
compliance with the RPS, solar revenues (which are given by electricity savings, federal
and state incentives, and SREC revenues) should be at least equal to the marginal cost
of adding solar capacity at the RPS quantity. If electricity prices and incentives are equal
across states, then SREC prices in state A must be higher than in state B to compensate
for the difference in the marginal cost of solar installations. Our strategy aims to estimate
these supply curves using solar installations data, the states’ solar RPSs, SREC prices, and
6

In Appendix A.7 we present an equivalent graph with REC prices. REC prices are considerably lower than
SREC prices. Given that solar credits can be used to comply with both the Tier/Class 1 requirements and
the (more binding) solar carve-out, the price of SRECs must be at least as high as that of Tier/Class 1
RECs.
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other incentives.
The rest of this section details our strategy, which consists of a two-step estimation method.
In the first step, we recover the slope of states’ solar supply curves using variation in solar
system equilibrium prices and quantities. In the second step we propose a calibration
strategy that exploits differences in solar revenues (SREC prices, electricity savings and
subsidies) across states and years to pin down the vertical intercepts of each state’s supply
curve. We begin by introducing the data used in our supply curve estimation, and then
present our method and results.
2.3.1. Data Sources
We collect data from multiple sources. First, we use data on residential solar installations
and prices from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2020). For each installation we
have information on the size of the system (capacity in kW), total installation cost (including
cost of the panels), location (zip code), date of installation, rebates, an indicator for third
party-owned systems (e.g., systems with a lease contract or a power purchase agreement)
and other technical characteristics (module type, module manufacturer, module model, and
number of inverters). The data cover the period from 2007 to 2019, although the coverage
of this data set varies substantially across states.
We obtain information on states’ solar RPSs from a collection of state websites and from the
Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE). This consists of states’
interim annual targets and RPS trading rules for the period of 2010 to 2019. In Section 2.4
we explain how we adjust the RPS targets to account for the fact that we only use data
on residential installations to compute our supply curves. From the Energy Information
Administration (EIA), we collect state-level data on solar energy generation (by sector and
source) and total electricity generation for the period of 2015 to 2019.7 We collect data on
SREC prices for eight states from Barbose et al. (2019) for the period of 2010 to 2019. We
combine these data sets to compute annual state solar targets in megawatts. See Appendix
7

For solar energy, solar residential, and electricity generation data, we use U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2021a).
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A.8 for details on data processing.
We compute electricity savings using average electricity rates data at the state level from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2021a) and collect data on state-level incentives
from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2020). Finally, we use population data
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2021).
2.3.2. Supply Curve Estimation (Step 1)
In the first step of our supply curve estimation we note that supply and demand for solar
energy varies within states (Gillingham et al., 2016). Therefore, we split states into distinct
geographical markets and estimate market-level supply curves that we then aggregate to
construct state-level supply curves. This approach exploits the disaggregate nature of our
installation-level data and allows us to capture within-state differences in solar radiation
that we use to identify the supply curve, and differences in installation costs that will
ultimately determine the slope of the state’s supply curve.
To ensure that our results do not depend on how we define solar markets, we consider
three possible market definitions. The first approach assumes that each census place is
a market.8 Under the second market definition, counties with less than 200,000 residents
(the 75th percentile of county population) become single markets and all other counties are
divided into smaller markets according to census places. The third definition uses a census
place as a market if its population exceeds the median across all census places; all smaller
census places are lumped together at the county level.
Using the LBNL data on residential solar installations, we compute the total quantity
installed (in kW) and the average price per kW at the market-year level. We complement
this with the market’s population from the Census Bureau. We drop small markets, those
below the 10th percentile of population.9 We then add a measure of solar radiation at the
8

According to the U.S. Census Bureau: “An incorporated place is established to provide governmental
functions for a concentration of people as opposed to a minor civil division, which generally is created to
provide services or administer an area without regard, necessarily, to population."
9
The 10th percentile of the population distribution ranges from 400 to 3,500 people depending on the
market definition. In Appendix A.9 we show that our results are robust to using a 1st or 5th percentile
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market level, which we call the solar radiation factor (SRF). We compute the SRF in three
steps. First, we predict the expected generation (in kWh) of a system of 6.5 kW (the average
in the data), located at the geographic center of the market (see Appendix A.8 for details).
Second, we compute the potential generation, defined as the generation in kWh a system
would have if it produced at maximum capacity in every hour of the year (i.e., perfectly
sunny days and only daylight hours). Finally, we compute the SRF as the ratio of expected
to potential generation. This measure captures differences across markets in how much of
a solar system’s potential is actually realized.
2.3.2.1. Summary Statistics
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the market-level data. For market definition 3,
the average market installs 54 kW per 1000 people in a year, or 8.3 systems of 6.5 kW. The
average price per kW is $3,904. There is significant variation in these figures. Some markets
install almost 1,000 kW per 1000 people in a year and prices can be as high as $8,285 per
kW. The average solar radiation factor is 20%. This implies that in the average market only
20% of the potential generation of a solar system is realized. This number can be as high as
25% in certain parts of Arizona and as low as 14% in certain parts of Vermont, depending
on cloud cover patterns, latitude and daytime hours.
A substantial amount of the variation in average prices is due to technological improvements
in solar technology that have occurred over the years. In Figure 2.4 we present the average
installation price per kW by year in the LBNL data. The graph shows that the average
cost per kW has dropped by more than 44% since 2010, with the bulk of this reduction
occurring before 2014.
2.3.2.2. Market- and State-Level Supply Curve Estimation
Using our market-level data we estimate the following supply curve for market m and year
y:
population cutoff.
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(Price per kW)m,y = θ(kW per 1000 people)m,y + αy + ϵm,y

(2.1)

Population serves as a proxy for the size of the market, as we want to allow for flatter supply
curves in markets with a larger population. Intuitively, ramping up installations in a small
market like Bethlehem, PA should have a stronger effect on price than doing so by the same
amount in a large market like Los Angeles, CA. Therefore, our supply curve allows for the
effect of installed capacity on price to be larger in markets where new installed capacity is
high relative to population. The year-specific intercept αy is the same across all markets
and captures declining costs of solar due to technological improvements. We discuss below
the second step of our estimation strategy, which introduces differences in the intercept
across states.
Given that in each market we only observe equilibrium quantities and prices, demand shifters
are needed to identify the supply curve parameters. Consumers’ demand for solar panels
depends on the actual generation (in kWh) of the panels which is determined by solar
radiation (and other factors, such as utility rates). Solar installers provide consumers with
quotes that include the system’s expected generation. Therefore, consumer demand is
affected by solar radiation through the information they receive from solar installers in
a solar quote (EnergySage, 2018). For solar radiation to be a valid demand shifter, we
assume that it does not directly affect installation costs. That is, holding the number
of installations fixed, the marginal installation cost is not affected by variation in solar
radiation. Installation cost mostly consist of the material cost of solar panels and the cost
of labor. Solar radiation might affect the availability of installers in a given market, however,
this effect is driven by demand for installations rather than solar radiation per se. Assuming
this exclusion restriction allows us to estimate equation (2.1) using the solar radiation factor
as an instrument for the installed capacity per capita.
Table 2.4 presents the estimates of the market-level supply curves for the three market
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definitions (Appendix A.9.1 reports the first stage estimates). Across all definitions the
average price per kW is considerably higher in 2015 relative to 2016-2019, but with no
clear pattern within that period. To interpret our estimates of the supply curve’s slope we
consider the price change that results from increasing the observed annual installations (in
kW per capita) by 1% in all the market-year combinations in our data. We find that the
median price increase ranges from 0.1% to 0.3%, depending on the market definition, so
ramping up solar installations during our period of study has a meaningful impact on the
cost of solar energy. For the remainder of the paper we choose market definition 3 as our
main specification because it provides the most conservative estimates of the slope of the
market-level supply curves. As a result, any benefits from more flexible RPS design will be
larger when using supply curves estimated from the first two market definitions.
Next, for market definition 3, we consider an equal increase in annual installations in all
markets. For an increase of 10 kW, which is what the median market installs in a given
year, we find that the median increase in the price per kW is equal to 0.20%. The 25th
percentile price increase (in larger markets) equals 0.08% and the 75th percentile price
increase (in smaller markets) is 0.43%. This highlights that less populous markets are more
easily saturated, reflected in a higher marginal cost of installation. These differences will
be crucial in determining the shape of our state-level supply curves, as we explain below.
Finally, we aggregate our market-level supply curves to the state level. We use the estimates
from market definition 3. In Appendix A.10.1, we present our state-level supply curves using
the other two market definitions. These curves are slightly steeper than the ones for market
definition 3. This is expected given that the coefficient on per capita installations is higher
for market definitions 1 and 2, relative to 3.
To aggregate to the state level, we first assume that market-level solar supply curves become
steep at levels of installations that substantially exceed current annual solar installations.
This assumption introduces convexity to our state-level supply curves. We assume that
each market has an annual limit on new installations and compute these limits as follows.
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Let Im,s,y be the maximum amount installed (in kW) in market m and state s across years
{2015, ..., y}. The annual limit is given by Im,s,y × F , where F > 1 is a maximum capacity
factor. Since we cannot pin down F from the data, we perform our analysis and present
the results over a range of values for F in Section 2.4. In our main specification we assume
F = 1.5. This essentially assumes that ramping up installations by more than 50% of the
maximum amount installed over the period 2015-2019 would lead to steep cost increases.
We perform extensive sensitivity analysis in Appendix A.10. Although the exact convexity
of supply is difficult to estimate, the qualitative insights of this paper hold for a very wide
range of alternative assumptions about convexity.
To compute the supply curve in state s and year y, we start with new installations at zero
in each market, and install each consecutive kW in the market with the lowest marginal
cost among the markets within that state with remaining capacity. This creates a mapping
between the quantities installed and the prices at which they are installed. The maximum
capacity factor is crucial at this stage, as it cuts off markets once they have installed their
limit.
2.3.3. Calibration of State-Level Curves Intercepts (Step 2)
In the second step, we propose a method to pin down the intercepts of the state-level supply
curves. We consider the marginal installation necessary to reach the RPS target, and note
that, to ensure compliance, the expected solar revenues of this system must be greater than
or equal to its cost of installation. If non-SREC revenues (electricity savings10 and other
financial incentives) are below the cost of installation, then the SREC price will be positive
and increase the benefits of the system enough to make them equal to its (marginal) cost.
Using the supply curves presented above, we compare the marginal cost of reaching the
state’s RPS target with the benefits produced by the marginal kW necessary to reach this
target. These benefits are given by:
10

We assume that households use the current SREC price to compute the discounted benefits.
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Benefits(kW )t =

T
X

β t (Electricity Savings per kW + SREC Revenue per kW

t=0

+ Federal and State Benefits)t .

where T is the lifetime of a solar panel and β is a discount factor.11 Let RP Ss,y be the
increase in quantity (in kW) needed to reach the state’s RPS target in year y. Using the
supply curves from step 1, we can compute the marginal cost of increasing solar capacity
by the amount RP Ss,y . We compare this marginal cost to the benefits of the marginal kW
necessary to reach the RPS target. We then shift the supply curve’s intercept vertically
to guarantee that marginal costs equal marginal benefits at the quantity that satisfies the
state’s RPS. This calibration captures state-level differences in compliance costs reflected
by the SREC prices and introduces state-year level heterogeneity in the intercept of states’
supply curves that is not captured in our market-level estimation. Figure 2.5 illustrates our
calibration.
This supply curve allows us to compute the marginal cost of increasing installations at
any point below the state’s annual installation limit (which is determined by the annual
installation limits of the markets that comprise the state). To enable us to extrapolate
beyond that limit and ease the strong assumption of vertical supply, for each state s and
year y, we fit the parameters of a double exponential function:

Ss,y (q) = α1s,y exp(β1s,y × q) + α2s,y exp(β2s,y × q)

(2.2)

using the supply curve constructed above. In equation (2.2), q represents new installations
in kW and α1s,y , α2s,y , β1s,y , β2s,y are parameters that we fit using the points on the supply
11

We set the discount factor equal to 0.8. This choice is based on evidence that consumers heavily discount
the benefits of solar technologies (De Groote and Verboven, 2019).
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curve under the state’s installation limit. In Appendices A.10.4 and A.10.5, we consider an
alternative linear extrapolation and find that our results are robust to this change in the
approximation.
Figure 2.6 presents the fitted supply curves of a subset of states with solar carve-outs for
the years 2015 and 2019: Arizona, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New Mexico (we use a
subset for visual clarity). These curves illustrate the differences in cost both across states
and years. Capacity expansion and technological improvements drive down the cost of new
installations over time. Across states there is also interesting variation in the cost of solar
energy. While it is relatively cheap to install a small amount of solar energy in New Mexico,
its limited solar market increases the marginal cost rapidly. Meanwhile, Arizona possesses
a much larger capacity than the other states and is able to install more solar before hitting
the steeper part of its supply curve.
We caveat our results by emphasizing that our supply curve estimation requires some strong
assumptions and several of our simulated policies are far out-of-sample. Therefore, we suggest our results be interpreted as qualitative or relative rather than as precise quantitative
estimates. In Section 2.4 we present results where the RPS is satisfied on the steep part of
the supply curve as well as on the flat part—covering a wide range of possible outcomes.

2.4.

Policy Counterfactuals

In this section we present the problem a “national" planner faces when deciding how to
satisfy an RPS. The planner must achieve a national RPS target given the states’ solar cost
curves and subject to interim annual targets and trading restrictions. Using our estimated
state supply curves we solve the planner’s problem for different sets of restrictions and RPS
targets.
2.4.1. National Planner’s Problem
Consider the problem of a national planner deciding how to allocate installations across
states (s ∈ {1, ..., S}) and time (t ∈ {1, ..., T }) to minimize cost while achieving an RPS
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target in kW (RP STs )12 and subject to the states’ interim annual targets and geographic
trading rules. A target is defined as a level of cumulative installations that the planner
must reach. This gives rise to the following cost minimization problem:

min
s
qt

S X
T
X

β t−1 Cts qts

s=1 t=1

s.t. qts ≥ 0, for t ∈ {1, ..., T }
t
X

qjs ≥ RP Sts for t ∈ {1, ..., T }, for s ∈ {1, ..., S}

j=1

(2.3)

(geographic trading rules)
t X
S
X
j=1 s=1

qjs

≥

S
X

RP Sts for t ∈ {1, ..., T }, for s ∈ {1, ..., S}

s=1

(interim annual targets)

The planner might face four different scenarios:
1. All restrictions: The planner faces both state interim annual RPS targets and
geographic trading restrictions. This is closest to the actual policy environment in
most U.S. states.
2. Interim targets: There are state-level interim annual RPS targets, but cross-state
trading is allowed.
3. No trading: There are no interim annual RPS targets, but cross-state trading is
prohibited.
4. No restrictions: There are no constraints in the planner’s cost minimization problem.
12

As explained in Section 2.2 RPSs are usually set as a percentage of generation, i.e. in kWh. However, to
match the units of our supply curves we convert these RPS targets into capacity (in kW) needed to reach
said targets. Appendix A.8.2 explains this conversion.
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In our counterfactuals below we consider the period of 2015 to 2019 and include seven states
with a solar carve-out in this period: Arizona, Delaware, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey and New Mexico.13 We convert the states’ RPS targets, generally
set as a fraction of electricity sales (in kWh), into solar capacity (in kW) needed to comply
with the RPS. Since our solar supply curves are representative of only the residential solar
sector, we adjust the states’ RPS to account for this by multiplying the RPS target by the
ratio of residential solar installations and total solar installations at the state-year level.
Appendix A.8.2 provides further details. Under the assumption that non-residential solar
installations are always inframarginal, it is sufficient to focus on the part of the supply curve
attributed to residential solar installations (Section 2.3) and the “residual” solar RPS to
solve for the equilibrium. Table 2.5 presents the interim targets (in MW) for each state.
Note that these are cumulative RPS targets relative to 2014 installed capacity. Annual
increases in the RPS correspond to the annual differences in targets for each state. In
our first counterfactual exercise we focus on this case, which we call the baseline RPS. In
addition to the baseline RPS, we also consider tighter (looser) RPSs and various alternative
allocations of the installations across states and years.
2.4.2. Cost-Minimizing Allocations for the Observed RPS
In our first counterfactual exercise we consider how the cost-minimizing allocations at our
baseline RPS change under the four different scenarios. Figure 2.7 presents the allocation of
new installations across states and years under each set of rules. For each year, the y-axis
indicates total new capacity across all states. The color indicates what amount of that
annual new capacity is installed in each state. Total added capacity across all states and
years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220 MW, and is constant across scenarios.
The top panels require states to meet their targets with within-state installations. The
bottom panels eliminate this restriction. Similarly, in the panels on the left the interim
targets specified in the last row of Table 2.5 must be met. In the panels on the right we
13

We do not include the other five states with a solar carve-out due to limitations in the coverage of the
LBNL and EIA data that do not allow us to estimate a solar supply curve for Illinois, Maryland, Nevada,
Ohio and Pennsylvania.
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remove this requirement. We explain each figure in more detail below.
The top-left panel presents the allocation of new installations in the case with both annual
targets and geographic trading restrictions. This figure plots the added capacity necessary
to reach all interim targets. For example, the amount installed by Arizona in 2016 is equal
to the difference between the 2016 and 2015 RPS targets for Arizona specified in Table
2.5. The first thing to note is that because of trading restrictions and the ambitious targets
in the Northeast during our period of study, most of the installations occur in this region
and, specifically, in Massachusetts and New Jersey. Also, the states’ schedules ramp up
installations particularly in 2017 and 2018. These two years represent close to 56% of the
installations.
We consider how the allocation of installations changes in the absence of annual targets,
while maintaining trading restrictions, i.e., while still requiring states to reach their final
2019 target, but not necessarily the interim targets. Note that this is akin to allowing
for SREC borrowing. The top-right panel presents the cost minimizing allocations in this
case. It is clear from the figure that the initial schedule was not cost minimizing, and that
a social planner would choose to back-load installations absent annual targets. Without
annual targets, 89% of installations occur in the last two years. There are two main reasons
for this. First, exogenous cost reductions over time favor later installations. Second, the
continual expansion of capacity in all markets allows more installations in markets with
flatter supply curves in later years. The distribution of installed capacity by state remains
the same when interim targets are relaxed, as states still need to meet their targets locally.
Next, we compute the cost-minimizing allocations in the absence of trading restrictions
but maintaining the states’ annual targets. This case is equivalent to a federal RPS with
intermediate targets equal to the ones in the last row of Table 2.5. The bottom-left panel
presents these results. To minimize cost, the planner moves installations from the Northeast
to Arizona, New Mexico and Missouri. Installations in these states increase by 250% when
trade is allowed relative to the case with all restrictions. In contrast, installations in the
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Northeast decrease by 60%. When the interim annual targets are also lifted (bottom-right),
the distribution of new installations across states remains roughly similar to the one in the
bottom-left panel but back-loading occurs.
To summarize, we find that the allocation subject to observed state annual targets and
trading rules is not cost-effective. Achieving cost-effectiveness involves a significant reallocation of installations across states, which is enabled by allowing for cross-state trading
in SRECs. This reallocation would exploit the solar potential of the American Southwest
and decrease the amount of solar installations in the Northeast. Removing interim annual
targets would further enhance efficiency by taking advantage of changes in the cost of solar
due to technological innovations.
2.4.3. Cost per Gigawatt for Different RPS Targets
We now explore how cost inefficiencies due to annual targets and trading rules vary for
different RPS targets. Figure 2.8 presents the average cost per GW for the four planner’s
scenarios as a function of the magnitude of the combined RPS targets across states.
At the observed RPS (black vertical line), the cost is 32% lower without interim annual
targets (green line) relative to the case with all restrictions (red line). Similarly, only
eliminating geographic trading restrictions reduces the cost of implementing the observed
RPS by 21% (blue line). Allowing for trade and removing annual targets leads to a cost
reduction of 46% (purple line).
The cost differences across scenarios increase as the RPS becomes more ambitious. We
consider the same percentage distribution of RPS targets across years and states as before,
but we vary the overall RPS target.14 We find that, when the overall RPS increases by
75%, implementing this more ambitious standard without restrictions is 58% cheaper than
doing so with all restrictions. Eliminating either annual targets or geographic trading rules
also lead to significant cost reductions. The cost in these two scenarios is 46% lower in both
cases, respectively. These large cost differences can be explained by the convexity of the
14

This distribution is obtained by dividing each element of Table 2.2 by the total RPS target (1,220 MW).
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state-level supply curves—the flexibility benefits of trading and eliminating interim targets
are especially valuable when the solar market is close to capacity.
In general, relaxing restrictions makes it possible to achieve much larger RPS targets without
reaching prohibitively high costs per GW. Figure 2.9 further illustrates this point. In the
absence of any restrictions (fourth bar), the RPS target can be more than three times as
high as the observed target (black horizontal line) while maintaining a cost per GW on
the same level as that of the observed target with all restrictions (first bar, black line).
Raising the RPS target by a factor of three would imply much higher costs if one imposed
geographic trading rules (second bar), interim targets (third bar), or both (first bar).
Together, these results show that interim annual targets and geographic trading restrictions
can lead to significant cost inefficiencies in the implementation of RPSs. These inefficiencies
become especially pronounced as we attempt to achieve higher levels of renewable energy
generation.
2.4.4. Alternative RPS Schedules
The counterfactual exercises presented above used the annual state targets observed in the
data as our baseline. In this section we propose alternative annual targets and explore the
cost inefficiencies associated with these alternative target schedules to further understand
the implications of interim target setting.
Specifically, we propose two simple schedules that policy makers might consider. First, a
linearly increasing schedule where the same amount is installed every year until the target is
reached. Second, an accelerating schedule where the amount installed increases every year
until the target is reached. As a reference we also consider the observed schedule. Table
2.6 presents these three alternatives.
We consider different combined RPS targets and for each we compute the cost of implementing the RPS in the absence of geographic trading restrictions and with annual targets
like the ones described above. As a reference, we also compute the cost with no restrictions.
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We then compute the cost increase that results from imposing interim annual targets for
each RPS schedule and show the results in Figure 2.10.15
The figure shows that for RPS targets of up to 3 times the observed one, a constant schedule
is 2 to 4 times more expensive than an accelerating one and the observed schedule is 1.5
to 3 times costlier. This reaffirms that back-loading installations leads to significant cost
advantages. However, even the accelerating schedule we propose does not approximate
the most cost-effective allocation across years, which would back-load installations even
further. Implementing the RPS with accelerating interim annual targets is at least 18%
costlier than doing so without them for RPS targets up to twice as large as the current
RPS target. However, as the RPS continues to increase, the accelerating schedule closely
approximates the cost in the case with no interim targets.
There are large cost differences between the proposed alternatives. These results show that
these simple schedules can fail to significantly reduce the cost inefficiency associated with
interim annual targets. In order to decrease the cost of implementing RPSs, policy makers
may have to anticipate changes in the cost curves of solar energy due to technological changes
and other supply-side conditions. In practice, this could be difficult and supports the use of
more flexible RPS rules that allow for banking and borrowing of renewable energy credits,
essentially removing or at least reducing the bindingness of interim targets, depending on
the number of years over which SRECs can be borrowed.
2.4.5. Alternative Allocations of the RPS
In this section we consider other allocations of installations across states besides the one we
observe in the data. Rather than considering specific alternatives to the current allocations
across states (which are heavily influenced by political factors), we consider a large number
of potential allocations and study how these affect the cost of implementation.
15

In Appendix A.10.6 we compute the cost of implementing the RPS with geographic trading restrictions
and with annual targets as described above. Our results in this case are similar to the ones presented in
this section. The cost of imposing interim targets of any type is even higher when we also impose
geographic trading restrictions and the cost ranking of the three alternatives does not change.
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Given an RPS target, we randomly allocate it across states. We consider three different
targets: the one we observe in the data, half of this target, and a target that is 50% higher
than the observed one. For each we compute 500 different random allocations. For each
random allocation we compute the cost increase from restricting trade across states, in the
absence of interim targets.16
Figure 2.11 presents a histogram of the cost increases for each combined RPS target. For
a small RPS of 50% of the observed one, most of the allocations across states result in
moderate cost increases from imposing geographic trading restrictions (red bars). In this
case, the median cost increase is 15% and the 90th percentile cost increase is 23%. For the
observed RPS (green bars), the median cost increase remains moderate, at 14%. However,
some allocations lead to large cost inefficiencies. The 90th percentile in this case is 57%. For
an RPS target of 1.5 times the observed RPS (blue bars), the cost of imposing geographic
restrictions increases dramatically. In over 70% of the allocations the cost of implementing
the RPS more than doubles when we impose trading restrictions. This large cost increase
happens because the RPS in one or more states reaches the very steep part of the solar
supply curve. While the specific numerical results are sensitive to the assumed supply
convexity at high levels of installations, the figure makes clear that highly-ambitious state
targets can easily become prohibitively expensive when cross-state trading is restricted.
Considering a large number of potential allocations of installations across states we find
that geographic trading restrictions lead to moderate to severe cost inefficiencies. These
inefficiencies increase significantly for more ambitious RPS targets. Allowing for trade of
renewable energy credits would mitigate these cost increases associated with uncoordinated
state mandates substantially. Our results suggest that as the need for renewable energy
increases, the importance of these flexible trading rules will rise dramatically for almost all
potential allocations of installations across states.
16

In Appendix A.10.6 we present the cost distribution with interim targets in place. In this case the
distribution is more skewed to the right. However, qualitatively the results we present below still hold in
this case.
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2.5.

Conclusion

In this paper we study the design of renewable energy portfolios standards. We focus
on solar energy carve-outs and analyze two commonly observed market-design features
of RPSs: cross-state trading restrictions and interim annual targets. Using historically
observed RPSs and estimated state-level solar supply curves we find that these constraints
can have a dramatic effect on the cost of reaching a given RPS target, especially when the
standard is set ambitiously.
We find that allowing for cross-state trading could have reduced implementation costs by
24% and significantly changed the geographic distribution of new installations over the period 2015-2019. Similarly, removing interim annual RPS targets would have reduced costs
by 32% by back-loading installations. These cost reductions become much larger when
we consider more ambitious RPS targets, i.e., when solar supply becomes more capacityconstrained. Together our results suggest that trading, back-loading, banking, and borrowing can mitigate escalating costs and preserve the feasibility of RPSs.
Our paper opens up future research opportunities by making the first effort to estimate
state-level solar supply curves and simulating scenarios with much larger RPS targets than
have been met so far, but that several states have adopted going forward. To do this,
we rely on assumptions on the capacity limits of existing solar markets to construct outof-sample solar supply curves. We present an extensive set of robustness tests to ensure
these assumptions do not drive our results in a qualitative manner, although our numerical
estimates of relative cost inefficiencies do change. Observing the behavior of solar markets
as they become more saturated will allow future research to have a more informed stance
on capacity limits, and facilitate the estimation of solar supply curves.
Our results should be of interest to economists and practitioners of energy and environmental policy. Renewable portfolio standards are first-order policies to facilitate a shift
towards a low-carbon economy. As policy ambitions ramp up, and the standards tighten,
governments are well-advised to make sound and flexible policy-design choices that prevent
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unnecessary cost escalation. With considerable uncertainty about the supply curve of solar
within/across years, as policymakers increase RPSs, trading, banking, borrowing (at least
over limited time periods) and convex interim targets can avoid escalating costs. These
benefits need to be properly weighed against other objectives, such as local job creation,
improved local air quality, and moral hazard concerns with delaying investments in renewable energy. Such flexibility has a proven track record: cross-state regional trading of Tier 1
RECs is commonly accepted; replicating the same model for SRECs would further enhance
the cost-effectiveness of renewable energy standards.
Finally, our results are of particular interest to the discussion of the design of a federal
renewable portfolio standard with a solar carveout. From a state perspective, local job creation and local environmental benefits might outweigh the cost reductions of allowing for
cross-state trade, at least politically. From a federal perspective, however, a solar RPS with
flexible trading rules would only reallocate local job creation and air pollution across the
country, eliminating two of the strongest arguments in favor of geographic trading restrictions. Our results indicate that geographic trading restrictions can significantly increase
the cost of implementing an RPS target; a federal RPS that allows for cross-state trading
would reduce total cost substantially relative to RPSs that are administered at the state
level, with likely little overall impact on the aggregate employment and pollution benefits
side.
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Table 2.1: RPS information for all relevant states
State
Arizona
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Washington D.C.
Wisconsin

Established
2006
2002
2004
1998
2005
2001
2007
2011
2015
1999
2004
1997
2008
2007
2007
2005
1997
2007
1991
2002
2004
2007
2007
2008
2010
2007
2004
2004
2014
2008
1999
2008
2015
2020
2006
2005
1998

Terminal target
%
Year
15%
2025
100%
2045
100%
2050
44%
2030
40%
2035
100%
2045
25%
2025
10%
2025*
20%
2020*
100%
2050
50%
2030
35%
2030
15%
2021
26.5%
2025
15%
2021
15%
2015
100%
2050
25.2%
2025
50%
2030
100%
2045
70%
2030
12.5%
2021
10%
2015*
8.5%
2026
15%
2015*
100%
2040
18%
2020
38.5%
2035
2%
2021
10%
2015*
10,000 MW 2025
20%
2025*
75%
2032
100%
2045
100%
2045
100%
2032
10%
2015

Interim targets

Tracking system

Solar RPS

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

None
WREGIS
WREGIS
NEPOOL-GIS
PJM-GATS
None
M-RETS, PJM-GATS
Not designated
NAR
NEPOOL-GIS
PJM-GATS
NEPOOL-GIS
MIRECS
M-RETS
NAR
M-RETS, WREGIS
NVTREC, WREGIS
NEPOOL-GIS
PJM-GATS
WREGIS
NYGATS
NC-RETS
M-RETS
M-RETS, PJM-GATS
None
WREGIS
PJM-GATS
NEPOOL-GIS
None
None
ERCOT
WREGIS
NEPOOL-GIS
PJM-GATS
WREGIS
PJM-GATS
M-RETS

Yes**
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No

Notes: The terminal targets are the longest-range targets implemented by a state as of 2022. The tracking
system is the system where credits must be registered to be traded, and is indicative of where certificates
are eligible to be retired. The information comes from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables &
Efficiency (DSIRE) and a collection of state websites (see Table A.12.4 in Appendix A.11 for a full list of
sources).
* Denotes voluntary targets.
** Arizona’s RPS does not have a formal solar carve-out, however we consider the distributed generation
carve out to count as a residential solar carve-out, as this is how it is almost entirely satisfied.
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Table 2.2: Solar RPS by state as a percentage of total electricity sales, 2015-2019
Annual targets (percentage of statewide
AZ DE MD MA MO NV
2015 1.50 1.00 0.50 2.60 0.10 1.00
2016 1.80 1.25 0.70 2.73 0.10 1.20
2017 2.10 1.50 1.15 5.09 0.10 1.20
2018 2.40 1.75 1.50 6.42 0.20 1.20
2019 2.70 2.00 5.50 6.66 0.20 1.20
Geographic trading restrictions:

electricity sales):
NH NJ NM
0.30 2.75 3.00
0.30 3.00 3.00
0.30 3.20 3.00
0.50 4.30 3.00
0.60 4.90 3.00

OR
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04

PA
0.25
0.29
0.34
0.39
0.44

All states require that the solar carve-out be satisfied using within-state SRECs with
the exception of New Hampshire, which accepts New England SRECs.
Notes: The numbers in the table indicate the percentage of total electricity sales that must be sourced using
solar energy generation. The information comes from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables &
Efficiency (DSIRE) and a collection of state websites. See Table A.12.4 in Appendix A.11 for a full list of
sources.

Table 2.3: Summary statistics

Variable
kW per 1,000 people
Median price per kW
Solar radiation factor
Market population 2010
System size (kW)
kW per 1,000 people
Median price per kW
Solar radiation factor
Market population 2010
System size (kW)
kW per 1,000 people
Median price per kW
Solar radiation factor
Market population 2010
System size (kW)

Market
Obs
11,003
11,008
11,008
11,003
11,008
Market
7,853
7,858
7,858
7,853
7,858
Market
7,506
7,506
7,506
7,506
7,506

definition 1
Mean Std. Dev.
74
115
3,842
701
19
3
45,891
396,977
7.08
1.44
definition 2
63
98
3,927
652
20
2
67,207
467,515
6.89
1.33
definition 3
54
74
3,909
666
20
2
67,585
479,124
6.83
1.33

Min
0
991
14
431
2.31

Max
2,040
8,285
25
8,175,133
19.53

0
1,130
14
1,327
2.31

2,040
8,285
25
8,175,133
15.248

0
991
14
3,535
2.31

922
8,285
25
8,175,133
19.53

Notes: The table shows summary statistics for all three market definitions. A 10th percentile population
cutoff has been applied to each market definition. The solar radiation factor variable is presented as a
percentage. See Appendix A.8.1 for more details on the solar radiation factor.
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Table 2.4: Market-level supply curve estimates
(1)
Mkt Def 1
43.78∗∗
(16.14)

(2)
Mkt Def 2
31.44∗∗
(10.98)

(3)
Mkt Def 3
15.34∗∗∗
(2.13)

Year = 2016

-1438∗∗
(454)

-1007∗∗∗
(284)

-538∗∗∗
(47)

Year = 2017

-970∗∗∗
(199)

-705∗∗∗
(104)

-580∗∗∗
(29)

Year = 2018

-1211∗∗∗
(243)

-1007∗∗∗
(172)

-765∗∗∗
(36)

Year = 2019

-1235∗∗∗
(222)

-955∗∗∗
(116)

-847∗∗∗
(37)

1554
(976)
11,003
49.17

2679∗∗∗
(566)
7,853
52.84

3611∗∗∗
(87)
7,506
74.48

kW per 1000 people

Constant
Observations
F-stat

Notes: The table shows the second stage results of an IV regression, where the dependent variable is price
per kW. We use the solar radiation factor as an instrument for installed capacity. See Appendix A.8.1 for
more details on the solar radiation factor. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to market definitions 1 to 3.
The specifications include annual indicators for all years in the data (2015 is the reference category). See
Appendix A.9.2 for robustness in terms of population cutoffs. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: Solar RPS targets by state in megawatts relative to 2014 installed capacity,
2015-2019

AZ
DE
MA
MO
NH
NJ
NM
Total

2015
16.17
4.45
92.40
0.00
0.56
40.55
16.51
170.64

2016
48.47
20.07
152.59
0.00
0.95
134.60
19.50
373.74

2017
68.96
32.68
346.87
0.00
0.95
205.47
19.50
674.42

2018
106.73
44.75
457.96
16.32
9.18
397.68
22.21
1054.83

2019
149.17
54.07
457.96
17.11
12.28
498.50
30.80
1219.89

Notes: The table presents the RPS targets that we use as the baseline case in our policy counterfactuals.
These targets are in MW. We use EIA data on electricity sales and the states’ RPSs in percentage of total
electricity sales to obtain the target in MWh. Then, using the solar radiation factor we convert it into
necessary capacity (in MW) to reach the required generation (in MWh). We then multiply this target by
the ratio of residential solar to total solar generation at the state-year level to account for the fact that our
supply curves are estimated using residential solar systems only. Finally, we subtract the installed capacity
from 2014.

Table 2.6: Percentage of final target reached each year

Observed RPS
Linearly increasing RPS
Accelerating RPS

2015
14%
20%
10%

2016
30.6%
40%
25%

2017
55.3%
60%
45%

2018
86.5%
80%
70%

2019
100%
100%
100%

Notes: Table presents three different types of RPS schedules. For each option the columns indicate the
percentage of the final target that is reached every year, where the final target is defined as the increase in
installations that must be achieved in 2019 relative to the capacity already installed in 2014.
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2.6.

Figures
Figure 2.4: Average price per kW by year, 2010-2019

Notes: The figure shows the average price per kW of solar systems in the U.S. for the period of 2010 to 2019.
The average price was computed using data from Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2020).
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Figure 2.1: States with RPSs and solar carve-outs as of 2021

Notes: Figure (top) presents states with a renewable portfolio standard and solar carve-out as of 2021. We
interpret Arizona’s distributed generation carve-out as a solar carve-out as distributed generation in Arizona
almost exclusively consists of solar. Figure (bottom) presents a measure of states’ solar resource, which we
refer to as the solar radiation factor (see Section 2.3.2 for a detailed explanation). The information comes
from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE) and a collection of state websites
(see Table A.12.4 in Appendix A.11 for a full list of sources.)
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Figure 2.2: SREC prices in the U.S. Northeast, 2010-2019

Notes: Figure presents the Solar Renewable Energy Credit (SREC) price for ten states in the U.S. Northeast,
for the period of 2010 to 2019. One SREC represents the generation of one MWh of solar electricity. Data
for the figure was obtained from Barbose (2021a).

Figure 2.3: Solar supply curves example for two states with identical RPSs
Marginal Cost
State A
State B
Solar Revenues A

Solar Revenues B

0

RPS A = RPS B

MW

Notes: Figure presents an example of two states with the same RPS target and different marginal cost
curves for solar energy. State A’s solar revenues (electricity savings, federal and state incentives and SREC
revenues) must be higher to account for the difference in the cost of compliance.
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Figure 2.5: Supply curve calibration
Price

Price
Post-calibration
Pre-calibration

Pre-calibration
Benefits
Benefits - Marginal Cost

Benefits

Supply Curve

0

RPS

0

kW

RPS

kW

Notes: Figure illustrates the second step of our supply estimation method. We shift the supply curve estimates
from the first step vertically to ensure that the marginal cost of compliance with the RPS is equal to the benefits of
the marginal installation necessary to reach the RPS target. These benefits are given by electricity savings, SREC
revenues and other state and federal benefits.

64

Figure 2.6: States’ solar supply curves: 2015 (top) and 2019 (bottom)

Notes: The figure presents state-level solar supply curves for Arizona, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New
Mexico, for 2015 and 2019. These curves are constructed using the estimation method detailed in Section
2.3.
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Figure 2.7: Cost-minimizing allocations under the four different scenarios

Notes: Figure presents the cost-minimizing allocation of new installations for the four different scenarios
described in Section 2.4. For each year, the vertical axis indicates total new capacity across all states. The
color indicates what amount of that annual new capacity corresponds to each state. Total added capacity
across all states and years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220 MW, and is constant across scenarios.
To find the cost-minimizing allocation we solved the social planner’s problem using the solar supply curves
presented in Section 2.3.
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Figure 2.8: The cost of implementing renewable portfolio standards under various policy
designs and overall stringency of the RPS target

Notes: Figure presents the cost per GW of implementing RPSs of varying stringency of the RPS target, and
under different scenarios. The black vertical line labeled ’Obs RPS’ represents the GWs installed under the
baseline RPS.

Figure 2.9: Cost per GW in each scenario for different RPS targets

Notes: The color in the figure indicates the cost per GW of implementing RPSs of different target stringency
(vertical axis), and under different policy designs (horizontal axis). The black lines labeled ’Obs RPS’ indicate
the GWs installed under the baseline RPS.
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Figure 2.10: Cost increases of various interim annual target schedules

Notes: Figure presents the cost increase of imposing interim target schedules in the absence of geographic
trading restrictions. Each line represents one of the three different types of RPS schedules presented in Table
2.6.

Figure 2.11: Cost increase of geographic trading restrictions for different cross-state RPS
allocations and RPS targets

Notes: Figure presents the histogram of cost increases that result from imposing geographic trading restrictions in the absence of interim targets. Each observation is the cost increase associated with a random
allocation of a fixed RPS target across states. Each color represents RPS targets of varying stringency.
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APPENDIX
A.1.

Appendix Chapter 1

A.2.

Data Processing

A.2.1. SDWIS Data
SDWIS violation reports are accessed state-by-state from EPA SDWIS, restricting to active
status community water systems (CWS). The data includes many violations which appear
to be duplicate reports of the same violation; we identify unique violations using utility
ID, violation type (tier and contaminant name), and compliance period start date. We
consolidate any violations which are duplicates across these parameters. We exclude Tier
3 (non-health-based) violations from the analysis.
The EPA provides a mapping of utilities to county/counties served; because this is the most
granular geographic information available at the national level, we aggregate violations to
the county level in order to be matched to the HMS/RMS Nielsen data. Utilities vary in size
by orders of magnitude, necessitating a weighting scheme based on population served. We
experience three primary measurement issues in assigning population weights. First, some
utilities span portions of multiple counties, and we observe only the total customer base
rather than the customer base in each county. Second, while we observe population and
county/counties served for all utilities in the violations data, we do not observe population
served for utilities with zero violations. For this reason, we cannot assume that the sum
total of customers served by utilities in our data is proportionate to the county’s total
customer base. Third, utilities may include transient customers in their customer base; we
observe, for example, that utilities serving areas with beach amenities or amusement parks
report customer bases which far exceed the county’s total population.
Given these limitations, we make several necessary assumptions. First, for utilities which
span multiple counties, we assign weights based on the counties’ relative total population.
If Utility U serves 300 customers across counties A and B, wherein county A has twice the
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population of county B, we assign 200 customers to county A and 100 to county B. Second,
to address unobserved customer counts among utilities with no violations, we rely on 2019
Census population figures to assign county population values. If we observe 1 violation
for a customer count of 300 people in a county with population 1,000, then the weighted
violation total is 0.3 violations. Third, if the total customer count exceeds the Census
population total, we scale each utility’s weight (using county-specific customer total) so
that the sum total of customer count is equal to the Census population total. For example,
if the customer count across all utilities (which ever experience a violation) in a county is
200% the county’s Census population count, then each violation utility’s weight is scaled
by 0.5. This step may overestimate total violations in a county if, for example, a utility
serving half the population experienced zero violations (and is therefore unobserved in the
customer count total), while the utility reporting a violation has a high customer count
because it provides services to tourist facilities.
A.2.2. NHANES
We use publicly available NHANES dietary and demographic data; specifically, we focus on
survey participants’ total plain drinking water consumption, as well as total bottled versus
tap water consumption. For participants who report water consumption on both Day 1
and Day 2 of the survey, we take the average across both days. NHANES reports income
in brackets: we assign households the midpoint of the bracket reported. For households
top-coded at income of $75,000 or more, we assign a value of $85,000 for consistency with
the Nielsen data. We use standard survey weights as directed in NHANES supplementary
materials to estimate predictive demographic coefficients:

Wi,t = α + νXi,t + ρt + ϵi,t

(A.1)

Where Wi,t represents water consumption (total, bottled, or tap) in ounces by respondent i
in year t. Xi,t is a vector of demographic characteristics: household income, household size,
and indicator variables for Hispanic, Black, less than high school education, and college
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education or more. ρt captures year fixed effects from 2003 through 2017 (NHANES is
conducted on a two-year cycle: we assign the earlier year for each survey). Table A.4.1
presents the predictive coefficients.
Next, we apply these coefficients to county-level demographics. We rely on American Community Survey (ACS) year-level county demographic from 2010 through 2017:

Ŵc,t = α̂ + ν̂Xc,t + ρ̂t

(A.2)

Wherein Ŵc,t is used in the demand model analysis to estimate average per-person daily
water consumption in county c in year t.
A.2.3. Homescan Data
Our final sample consists of all purchases made in the bottled water and soft drinks and
carbonated beverages categories, by Homescan panelists in the period of 2004 to 2017.
To compute household income we use the income brackets in the raw data and for each
household-year observation we set the income equal to the mid-point of the observed bracket.
A.2.4. Retail Scanner Data
We use the Retail Scanner Data to compute a county-year level price measure for gallons of
bottled water. Our final sample covers the period of 2006 to 2017. To compute our measure
we use the following equation

PSc,t

Price per gallonc,t = PSc,t
s

Bottled Water Revenues,t
Bottled Water Sales (in gallons)s,t
s

where, {1, ..., Sc,t } are all stores in county c in year t.

A.3.

Evidence of Avoidance Behavior

In this section we further explore the relationship between water quality and consumption
of bottled water and soft drinks.
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A.3.1. Lagged Violations
We consider the following model:

yh,c,t = α+βViolationsc,t +γViolationsc,t−1 +θIncomeh,t ×Violationsc,t +νXh,t +ρt +µc +ϵh,t

Where yh,c,t represents consumption of the relevant product (bottled water, soft drinks)
by household h in county c in year t. Consumption is measured separately using each of
total ounces purchased and number of purchases. Violationsc,t is the total number of new
violations in county c and year t, Incomeh,t is the mean-centered annual income of household
h in year t. Xh,t is a vector of household characteristics, ρt and µc are year and county
fixed effects respectively.
The results suggest that lagged violations increase consumption, even while controlling for
current violations. However, in our preferred specifications in column 5 the effect is not
precisely estimated.
A.3.2. Reduced Form Regressions Including Education and Race
We consider the following model:

yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t
+ γEducationh,t × Violationsc,t
+ ξNon-Whiteh,t × Violationsc,t
+ νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t

Where yh,c,t represents consumption of bottled water by household h in county c in year
t. Consumption is measured separately using each of total ounces purchased and number
of purchases. Violationsc,t is the total number of new violations in county c and year
t, Incomeh,t is the mean-centered annual income of household h in year t, Educationh,t
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is the highest level of education achieved by the household head (no high-school, high
school, college, post-graduate education) and Non-Whiteh,t is a dummy that indicates if
the household head is non-white. Xh,t is a vector of household characteristics, ρt and µc
are year and county fixed effects respectively.
In our preferred specifications in column 5 we see that the interaction of the non-white
dummy variable with violations has a non-significant and small effect on consumption of
bottled water. We also see that the interaction of education with violations has a negative
effect on consumption of bottled water, however, this effect is not precisely estimated.
Finally, the effect of the interaction of income with violations is similar in magnitude to the
one presented in Section 1.3 and is statistically significant.

A.4.

Appendix Chapter 1: Tables
Table A.4.1: Demographic Predictors of Drinking Water Consumption

Hispanic
Black
Less than High School
College +
Total household size
Income
Survey year=2005
Survey year=2007
Survey year=2009
Survey year=2011
Survey year=2013
Survey year=2015
Survey year=2017
Constant
Obs
R-Squared

Plain
0.987∗
(0.566)
-2.903∗∗∗
(0.620)
-2.402∗∗∗
(0.503)
2.477∗∗∗
(0.555)
-1.922∗∗∗
(0.125)
2.695∗∗∗
(0.268)
-4.538∗∗∗
(1.710)
-5.960∗∗∗
(1.511)
-5.651∗∗∗
(1.469)
-1.365
(1.680)
-0.347
(1.669)
3.052∗
(1.714)
3.033∗
(1.688)
30.34∗∗∗
(1.778)
67498
0.0301

Tap
-6.046∗∗∗
(0.537)
-7.470∗∗∗
(0.584)
-1.683∗∗∗
(0.509)
5.170∗∗∗
(0.529)
-1.456∗∗∗
(0.125)
0.997∗∗∗
(0.254)
-4.863∗∗∗
(1.563)
-6.070∗∗∗
(1.414)
-6.519∗∗∗
(1.368)
-2.328
(1.443)
-2.323
(1.782)
-0.478
(1.600)
-3.650∗∗
(1.494)
24.71∗∗∗
(1.497)
67501
0.0434

Bottled
7.033∗∗∗
(0.541)
4.565∗∗∗
(0.441)
-0.719∗
(0.400)
-2.692∗∗∗
(0.401)
-0.466∗∗∗
(0.0915)
1.696∗∗∗
(0.208)
0.335
(0.740)
0.120
(0.938)
0.878
(0.999)
0.974
(1.024)
1.987∗∗
(0.985)
3.541∗∗∗
(0.973)
6.693∗∗∗
(1.308)
5.617∗∗∗
(0.981)
67503
0.0239

Income is measured in Ln(1000’s) here for clarity; county level estimates rely on coefficient of raw
estimated income. NHANES survey weights are applied. Plain water is inclusive of both tap and bottled
water; all water types include both at-home and away-from-home consumption. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table A.4.2: Consumption Regressions - Total Ounces Purchased
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

54.43***

57.02***

18.56

60.27***

20

Total New Violations (t-1)

23.52***

27***

5.16

27.87***

5.27

-

-

-

1.033***

0.56

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks
Total New Violations

61.73***

47.2***

-3.68

46.7***

-3.17

Total New Violations (t-1)

47.43***

32.58***

-17.33

32.44***

-17.29

-

-

-

-0.159***

0.198

HH Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is ounces of bottled water or ounces of soft drinks.

Table A.4.3: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

0.17***

0.18***

0.04

0.2***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.12***

0.13***

0.07

0.14***

0.07

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

Total New Violations

0.86***

0.71***

0.06

0.69***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.68***

0.51***

-0.14

0.5***

-0.14

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

-

-

-

-0.007***

-0.007

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.
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Table A.4.4: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

0.17***

0.18***

0.04

0.2***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.12***

0.13***

0.07

0.14***

0.07

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

Total New Violations

0.86***

0.71***

0.06

0.69***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.68***

0.51***

-0.14

0.5***

-0.14

-

-

-

-0.007***

-0.007

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.

Table A.4.5: Consumption Regressions - Number of Purchases
Bottled Water

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Total New Violations

0.17***

0.18***

0.04

0.2***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.12***

0.13***

0.07

0.14***

0.07

-

-

-

0.005***

0.002

Total New Violations

0.86***

0.71***

0.06

0.69***

0.04

Total New Violations (t-1)

0.68***

0.51***

-0.14

0.5***

-0.14

Income (in 1000s) X Violations
Soft Drinks

Income (in 1000s) X Violations

-

-

-

-0.007***

-0.007

Household Characteristics

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

County FE

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
***: p-value < 0.01, **: p-value < 0.05, *: p-value < 0.1
Household Characteristics: Race, income, household size and presence of children

Notes: Estimates for yh,c,t = α + βViolationsc,t + θIncomeh,t × Violationsc,t + νXh,t + ρt + µc + ϵh,t . Where,
yh,c,t is number of bottled water or soft drinks purchases.
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A.5.

Appendix Chapter 1: Figures

Figure A.5.1: MWTP for a one standard deviation improvement in water quality, by
income.
β̂ + θ̂ × Income
Notes: MWTP is given by
× Std. Dev. Violations. Cutoffs are used to classify households
α̂
into bottled or tap water consumers and each provides a different point estimate of β, α, θ. Shaded region
represents the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure A.5.2: Example of water quality violation - Part 1.
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Figure A.5.3: Example of water quality violation - Part 2.
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A.6.

Appendix Chapter 2

A.7.

Renewable Energy Credit Prices

Figure A.13.1 presents the REC prices for eight states with an RPS for the period of 2010
to 2019. Comparing this graph to the SREC price graph from Section 2.2 illustrates how
solar carve-outs in these states are binding. That is, the amount of solar installed to satisfy
Tier 1 requirements (i.e., all types of renewable electricity that are eligible to meet a state’s
RPS) is not enough to comply with the state’s solar targets. Therefore, the solar carveout is binding and SREC prices must be higher than REC prices to incentivize more solar
projects.

A.8.

Data Processing

A.8.1. Market-Level data
In this section we detail the steps we follow to construct the sample we use to estimate
our market-level supply curves. We start from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(2020) data, which is data at the installation level with information on the system’s size (in
kW), price, location (zip code), customer segment (residential, commercial or utility scale)
and an indicator for third party owned (TPO) systems (e.g., solar systems with a lease
contract or a power purchase agreement). We follow the steps below to process the data:
1. We drop all observations with missing zip code because there is no other consistent
way of verifying geographic location of the installations.
2. We use the price per kW for all non-TPO systems and define the price as missing for
all TPO systems.1
3. We winsorize the data, dropping all non-TPO residential systems with a size or price
per kW above the 99th percentile in the data. We do this to remove outliers caused
by misreporting.
1

We follow Pless and van Benthem (2019) who argue that TPO prices do not represent actual costs of
installation.
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4. We use a crosswalk file from UDS Mapper (2015) to match zip codes from the LBNL
data to zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs). Subsequently, we use crosswalk files from
the U.S. Census Bureau (2021) to match ZCTAs to census places and counties.
5. We use data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (2015) to assign centroid
points (latitude and longitude pairs) to each ZCTA.
6. We drop all non-residential systems and installations before 2006 due to data scarcity
in previous years.
7. Given the market definitions presented in Section 2.3, we aggregate systems to compute the market’s added capacity (kW). This is done at the annual level.
8. We compute the median price per kW across all non-TPO systems in the market.
This is done at the annual level.
9. We compute the market center as the average centroid (in terms of latitude and
longitude) of the ZCTA in which a system is located.
10. We compute the market’s population by adding up the population of all census places
located within the market.2
11. For each market we compute the annual expected generation of a system of 6.5 kW
(the average in the data), located at the center of the market, with a tilt equal to the
market’s latitude and with an azimuth of 180.3
12. We compute the potential generation of that same system by multiplying the system’s
size times the total number of hours in a year (8,760).
13. We compute the solar radiation factor (SRF) at the market level, which consists of
2
3

For market definition 2, we use the county population where appropriate.
We obtain the expected generation from NREL’s PVWatts V6 API. The API uses five inputs—system size,
latitude, longitude, tilt, and azimuth, and returns annual AC system output (KWhac).
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the ratio of expected to potential generation.

SRFm =

Expected Generationm
System’s Potential

(A.3)

where the system potential assumes that the average-sized system in a given market
operates 8,760 hours per year.
14. We obtain data from the EIA on the residential solar generation by state and year.
This data is available for all states starting in 2014 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2021a).
15. We create an adjustment factor for state s in year y that tries to capture the discrepancy between new residential solar generation from the EIA and new residential solar
reported in the LBNL data.

EIA Adjustment Factors,y =

New EIA Residential Solar Generations,y
New LBNL Estimated Generations,y

(A.4)

16. We obtain SREC Prices from (Barbose et al., 2019). Images converted to csv using
Web Plot Digitizer.
A.8.2. RPS Annual Targets
Given the institutional details in Section 2.2, RPS targets are usually defined in terms of a
percentage of state generation (kWh). However, in order to match the units of our supply
curves, we convert these RPSs in terms of capacity (kW). To compute the observed RPS in
kW, we follow these steps:
1. We collect the states’ interim solar targets, in percentage of total electricity sales, from
a collection of state websites and from the Database of State Incentives for Renewables
& Efficiency. See Appendix A.12.4 for a full list of sources.
2. We obtain annual state-level electricity sales from U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
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tration (2021a).
3. We compute the states’ annual solar targets in kWh using the data from 1 & 2.
4. From the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2021a), we obtain total solar generation and solar generation by residential systems. We compute the fraction of total
solar generation coming from residential systems at the state and year level.
5. We multiply the states’ annual solar targets (in kWh) by the fraction of residential
solar. We do this because our market-level data accounts only for residential systems.
6. We convert the annual solar target from generation to capacity using the following
expression:

Solar Target (in kWh)s,y = 8, 760 × Capacity (in kW)s,y × Average SRFs

where the average SRF is taken over all markets within state s and is defined in
equation A.3.
7. Since our policy counterfactuals cover the period of 2015 to 2019 we subtract the
cumulative capacity as of 2014 from the RPS target in all years.

A.9.

Tables and Figures

A.9.1. First-Stage Results for Market-Level Supply Curve Estimates
In Table A.12.1 we present the first stage of the market-level supply curve estimations from
Section 2.3. The table shows that our instrument is strong for all market definitions. For
all market definitions the coefficient on the solar radiation factor variable is significant and
the F-stat is high.
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A.9.2. Market-Level Supply Curve Estimates Under Different Assumptions of Population
Cutoffs
In the results in Section 2.4, we include only states for which the difference between the EIA
and LBNL data is less than a factor of 10. In addition, we correct our market definition by
keeping observations above the 10th percentile of population. Below in Table A.12.2 and
Table A.12.3, we offer the same regression specification but keep observations above the 1st
and 5th percentiles of the population, respectively.
The results for market definition 3 are robust to these changes and close to the ones presented
in Section 2.3. For market definitions 1 and 2 the results are less precise, however, they are
similar or larger in magnitude than the ones using the 10th percentile cutoff but imprecisely
estimated.

A.10.

Robustness Checks

A.10.1. Supply Curves Under Alternative Market Definitions
Figures A.13.3 and A.13.4 present the fitted supply curves for Arizona, Massachusetts, New
Jersey and New Mexico in 2015 and 2019 using the estimates from market definitions 1
and 2. The curves are slightly steeper than the ones for market definition 3. However, the
relative costs across states and years appear unchanged when using these alternative market
definitions.
A.10.2. Supply Curves Under Alternative Capacity Factor
Figure A.13.5 presents the fitted supply curves of Arizona, Massachusetts, New Jersey and
New Mexico in 2015 and 2019 assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2 (and market
definition 3). As expected, the curves are flatter than the ones using a factor of F = 1.5.
A.10.3. Counterfactual Results with Alternative Capacity Factor and Double Exponential
Approximation
A.10.3.1. Cost Minimizing Allocations for the Observed RPS
Figure A.13.6 presents the allocation of new installations across states and years under
each of the four scenarios. For each year, the y-axis indicates new capacity across all states.

83

The color indicates what amount of that annual new capacity is installed in each state.
Total added capacity across all states and years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220
MW, and is constant across scenarios. To compute these allocations we use supply curves
constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2. As in the main text, we fit a
smooth function through the supply curve using a double exponential approximation.
Similar to the case presented in Section 2.4, in the absence of interim targets the costminimizing allocation back-loads installations, and in the absence of geographic trading
restrictions Northeastern states see a large drop in installations in favor of states in the
Southwest.
A.10.3.2. Cost per Gigawatt for Different RPS Targets
Figure A.13.7 presents the average cost per GW for the four scenarios as a function of
the magnitude of the combined RPS targets across states. To compute these costs we use
supply curves constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2.
The results are similar to the ones presented in Section 2.4. Removing either type of
restrictions significantly decreases the cost per GW of implementing the RPS. And again,
these cost differences increase with the RPS target. Assuming a larger capacity factor does
expand the range of RPS targets that can be reached without running into prohibitively
expensive costs per GW, as illustrated by the right panel of the figure.
A.10.3.3. Alternative RPS Schedules and Alternative Allocations of the RPS
We consider different combined RPS targets. In Figure A.13.8 (left), we compute the cost
increase that results from imposing interim annual targets according to each of the three
RPS schedules in Table 2.6, in the absence of geographic trading restrictions.
Figure A.13.8 (right) presents a histogram of the cost increases resulting from restricting
cross-state trade for three combined RPS targets, but without imposing annual interim
targets. Given an RPS target we randomly allocate it across states. We consider the
following targets: the one we observe in the data, half of this target, and a target that is
50% higher than the observed one. For each we compute 500 different random allocations.
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For each random allocation we compute the cost increase from restricting trade across
states. To create both figures we use supply curves constructed assuming a maximum
capacity factor of F = 2.
The results are similar to the ones presented above. Figure A.13.8 (left) shows that there
are significant cost increases of imposing interim target schedules of any of the three types
considered and the ranking of these schedules is the same as in the case presented in Section
2.4. Figure A.13.8 (right), however, is different from the one presented in Section 2.4 in
that the distribution of costs shifts to the left. This is expected as with a higher maximum
capacity states do not reach the steepest part of the supply curve in most allocations.
Despite this, cost increases due to geographic trading restrictions are still significant in
most allocations.
A.10.4. Counterfactual Results with Alternative Capacity Factor and Linear Approximation
A.10.4.1. Cost-Minimizing Allocations for the Observed RPS
Figure A.13.9 presents the allocation of new installations across states and years under
each of the four scenarios. For each year, the y-axis indicates new capacity across all states.
The color indicates what amount of that annual new capacity is installed in each state.
Total added capacity across all states and years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220
MW, and is constant across scenarios. To compute these allocations we use supply curves
constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2 and approximate the supply
curves using a linear interpolation instead of a double exponential one.
Similar to the case presented in Section 2.4, in the absence of interim targets the costminimizing allocations back-loads installations and in the absence of geographic restrictions
Northeastern states see a large drop in installations in favor of states in the Southwest.
A.10.4.2. Cost per Gigawatt for Different RPS Targets
Figure A.13.10 presents the average cost per GW for the four scenarios as a function of
the magnitude of the combined RPS targets across states. To compute these costs we use
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supply curves constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2 and approximate
the supply curves using a linear interpolation.
The results are similar to the ones presented in Section 2.4. Removing either type of
restrictions significantly decreases the cost per GW of implementing the RPS. And again,
these cost differences increase with the RPS target. Assuming a larger capacity factor does
expand the range of RPS targets that can be reached without running into prohibitively
expensive costs per GW, as illustrated by the right panel of the figure. One important
difference with respect to the results from Section 2.4 is that the linear interpolation gives
the cost curves more of a hockey stick shape. This can be seen on Figure A.13.10 (right)
where costs jump drastically as the RPS target increases above some critical threshold.
A.10.4.3. Alternative RPS Schedules and Alternative Allocations of the RPS
We consider different combined RPS targets and for each we compute the cost of implementing the RPS in the absence of geographic trading restrictions and with annual targets
like the ones described in Table 2.6. As a reference, we also compute the cost with no
restrictions. We then compute the cost increase that results from imposing interim annual
targets for each RPS schedule and show the results in Figure A.13.11 (left). Given an RPS
target we randomly allocate it across states. We consider three different targets: the one we
observe in the data, half of this target, and a target that is 50% higher than the observed
one. For each we compute 500 different random allocations. For each random allocation
we compute the cost increase from restricting trade across states. Figure A.13.11 (right)
presents a histogram of the cost increases for each combined RPS target. To create both
figures we use supply curves constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2
and approximate the supply curves using a linear interpolation.
The results are similar to the ones presented above. Figure A.13.11 (left) shows that
there are significant cost increases of imposing interim schedules of any of the three types
considered and the ranking of these schedules is the same as in the case presented in Section
2.4. Again, the main difference with respect to the results from Section 2.4 is that the higher
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maximum capacity factor ensures that states do not reach the steepest part of the supply
curve even when the combined RPS targets more than doubles.
Figure A.13.11 (right), however, is different from the one presented in Section 2.4 in that
the distribution of costs shifts to the left. This is expected as with a higher maximum
capacity and linear interpolation states do not reach the steepest part of the supply curve
in most allocations. Despite this, cost increases due to geographic trading restrictions are
significant in most allocations.
A.10.5. Counterfactual Results with Linear Approximation and Baseline Capacity Factor
A.10.5.1. Cost Minimizing Allocations for the Observed RPS
Figure A.13.12 presents the allocation of new installations across states and years under
each of the four scenarios. For each year, the y-axis indicates new capacity across all states.
The color indicates what amount of that annual new capacity is installed in each state.
Total added capacity across all states and years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220
MW, and is constant across scenarios. To compute these allocations we use supply curves
constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 1.5 and approximate the supply
curves using a linear interpolation.
Similar to the case presented in Section 2.4 in the absence of interim targets the costminimizing allocations back-loads installations and in the absence of geographic restrictions
Northeastern states see a large drop in installations in favor of states in the Southwest.
A.10.5.2. Cost per Gigawatt for Different RPS Targets
Figure A.13.13 presents the average cost per GW for the four planner’s scenarios as a
function of the magnitude of the combined RPS targets across states. To compute these
costs we use supply curves constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 1.5
and approximate the supply curves using a linear interpolation.
The results are similar to the ones presented in Section 2.4. Removing either type of
restrictions significantly decreases the cost per GW of implementing the RPS. And again,
these cost differences increase with the RPS target. One important difference with respect
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to the results from Section 2.4 is that the linear interpolation gives the cost curves more of a
hockey stick shape. This can be seen on Figure A.13.13 (right) where costs jump drastically
as the RPS target increases above some critical threshold.
A.10.5.3. Alternative RPS Schedules and Alternative Allocations of the RPS
We consider different combined RPS targets, but with a linear instead of a double exponential supply curve approximation. In Figure A.13.14 (left), we compute the cost increase that
results from imposing interim annual targets according to each of the three RPS schedules
in Table 2.6, in the absence of geographic trading restrictions.
Figure A.13.14 (right) presents a histogram of the cost increases resulting from restricting
cross-state trade for three combined RPS targets, but without imposing annual interim
targets. Given an RPS target we randomly allocate it across states. We consider the
following targets: the one we observe in the data, half of this target, and a target that is
50% higher than the observed one. For each we compute 500 different random allocations.
For each random allocation we compute the cost increase from restricting trade across
states. To create both figures we use supply curves constructed assuming a maximum
capacity factor of F = 1.5.
The results are similar to the ones presented in Figure 2.11 in the main text. Figure A.13.14
(left) shows that there are significant cost increases of imposing schedules of any of the three
types considered and the ranking of these schedules is the same as in the case presented
in Section 2.4. The main difference with respect to the results from Section 2.4 is that for
the accelerating schedule the cost increase significantly drops as the RPS target increases.
This is due to the linear interpolation that ramps up costs aggressively only after reaching
a certain RPS target above some critical threshold.
Figure A.13.11 (right), however, is different from the one presented in Section 2.4 in that
the distribution of costs shifts to the left for the two smallest RPS targets we present. This
is expected as with a linear interpolation states only reach the steepest part of the supply
curve if the RPS target is sufficiently large. Despite this, cost increases due to geographic
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trading restrictions are significant in most allocations.
A.10.6. Robustness to Alternative Scenarios
We now repeat the same analysis as in Appendix Section 2.4 but with different assumptions
on trading restrictions and interim targets. In Figure A.13.15 (left), we compute the cost
increase that results from imposing interim annual targets according to each of the three
RPS schedules in Table 2.6, but now in the presence of geographic trading restrictions.
Figure A.13.15 (right) presents a histogram of the cost increases resulting from restricting
cross-state trade for three combined RPS targets, but now also imposing annual interim
targets. Given an RPS target we randomly allocate it across states. We consider the
following targets: the one we observe in the data, half of this target, and a target that is
50% higher than the observed one. For each we compute 500 different random allocations.
For each random allocation we compute the cost increase from restricting trade across
states. To create both figures we use supply curves constructed assuming a maximum
capacity factor of F = 1.5.
The results are similar to the ones presented above. Figure A.13.15 (left) shows that there
are significant cost increases of imposing schedules of any of the three types considered and
the ranking of these schedules is the same as in the case presented in Section 2.4. Figure
A.13.15 (right) is also similar to the one presented in Section 2.4 in that most allocations
result in large cost increases for all RPS targets.
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A.11.

RPS Targets Institutional Details

A.12.

Appendix Chapter 2: Tables
Table A.12.1: First stage: Market-level supply curve estimates

Solar Radiation Factor
N
R2
F

(1)
Mkt Def 1
200.8∗∗
(72.93)
11,003
0.008
49.17

(2)
Mkt Def 2
235.6∗∗
(80.45)
7,853
0.011
52.84

(3)
Mkt Def 3
542.7∗∗∗
(67.64)
7,506
0.042
74.48

Notes: The table shows the first stage results of an IV regression. The dependent variable is kW per 1000
people. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to market definitions 1 to 3. In the regression, we include only states
for which the installed capacity in the LBNL data is no more than 10 times smaller than that in the EIA
data. In addition, we correct our market definition by keeping observations above the 10th percentile by
population. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.12.2: Market-level supply curve estimates using 1st percentile population cutoff
(1)
Mkt Def 1
74.49
(91.88)

(2)
Mkt Def 2
86.20
(120.1)

(3)
Mkt Def 3
16.26∗∗∗
(2.302)

Year (==2016)

-2500.6
(2780.5)

-2751.3
(3549.6)

-563.3∗∗∗
(52.40)

Year (==2017)

-1533.5
(1257.7)

-1539.7
(1557.9)

-595.8∗∗∗
(31.14)

Year (==2018)

-1761.4
(1366.1)

-1980.2
(1979.8)

-783.0∗∗∗
(38.85)

Year (==2019)

-1867.1
(1415.4)

-1949.1
(1851.3)

-870.7∗∗∗
(40.41)

Constant

-1054.5
(6508.1)
11589

-1161.5
(7688.1)
8663

3563.9∗∗∗
(95.06)
7760

kW per 1000 people

Observations

Notes: The table shows the second-stage results of an IV regression, where the dependent variable is price
per kW. We use the solar radiation factor as an instrument for installed capacity. See Appendix A.8.1 for
more details on the solar radiation factor. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to market definitions 1 to 3. In
the regression, we include only states for which the difference between the EIA and LBNL data is less than
one order of magnitude. In addition, we correct our market definition by keeping observations above the 1st
percentile by population. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.12.3: Market-level supply curve estimates using 5th percentile population cutoff
(1)
Mkt Def 1
91.44
(82.97)

(2)
Mkt Def 2
33.12∗∗
(12.77)

(3)
Mkt Def 3
15.83∗∗∗
(2.185)

Year (==2016)

-2826.0
(2381.6)

-1100.5∗∗
(344.8)

-553.4∗∗∗
(49.47)

Year (==2017)

-1606.8
(1063.3)

-759.7∗∗∗
(127.7)

-591.5∗∗∗
(30.29)

Year (==2018)

-1869.4
(1161.2)

-1045.8∗∗∗
(198.9)

-781.2∗∗∗
(37.55)

Year (==2019)

-1949.3
(1204.1)

-995.4∗∗∗
(140.9)

-867.5∗∗∗
(38.75)

Constant

-1846.2
(5551.9)
11380

2412.6∗∗∗
(723.0)
8329

3588.2∗∗∗
(89.46)
7668

kW per 1000 people

Observations

Notes: The table shows the second-stage results of an IV regression, where the dependent variable is price
per kW. We use the solar radiation factor as an instrument for installed capacity. See Appendix A.8.1 for
more details on the solar radiation factor. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to market definitions 1 to 3. In
the regression, we include only states for which the difference between the EIA and LBNL data is less than
one order of magnitude. In addition, we correct our market definition by keeping observations above the 5th
percentile by population. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.12.4: Sources used to collect information on states’ renewable portfolio standards
and carve-outs
State
Arkansas
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Massachusetts
Maryland
Missouri
Minnesota
Nevada
Nevada
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Texas
Vermont
Wisconsin

Source
U.S. Energy Information Administration (2021g)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
CA Public Utilities Commission (2022)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
Center for the New Energy Economy, Colorado State University (2018)
Barbose (2021a)
PJM Environmental Information Service (2022)
PJM Environmental Information Service (2022)
PJM Environmental Information Service (2022)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
Research Division Legislative Counsel Bureau (2020)
National Conference of State Legislatures (2021)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
PJM Environmental Information Service (2022)
PJM Environmental Information Service (2022)
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (2021d)
Department of Public Service, State of Vermont (2016)
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (2015)
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Figure A.13.1: REC prices in the U.S. Northeast, 2010-2019

Notes: The figure presents the Renewable Energy Credit (REC) price for Tier/Class I certificates for ten
states in the U.S. Northeast, for the period of 2010 to 2019. One Tier/Class I certificate represents the
generation of one MWh of renewable electricity. The renewable energy sources that are included in Tier/Class
I varies across states. Data for the figure was obtained from Barbose (2021a).
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Figure A.13.2: Counties present in the LBNL data

Notes: The figure shows the coverage of the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2020) solar installation
data set by county. Counties in red appear in the data, while counties in gray do not.

Figure A.13.3: States’ solar supply curves: 2015 (left) and 2019 (right) using estimates
from market definition 1

Notes: Figure presents state-level solar supply curves for AZ, MA, NJ and NM, for 2015 and 2019. These
curves are constructed using the estimation method detailed in Section 2.3 and using the estimates based
on market definition 1.
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Figure A.13.4: States’ solar supply curves: 2015 (left) and 2019 (right) using estimates
from market definition 2

Notes: Figure presents state-level solar supply curves for AZ, MA, NJ and NM, for 2015 and 2019. These
curves are constructed using the estimation method detailed in Section 2.3 and using the estimates based
on market definition 2.

Figure A.13.5: States’ solar supply surves: 2015 (left) and 2019 (right) using a capacity
factor F = 2

Notes: Figure presents state-level solar supply curves for AZ, MA, NJ and NM, for 2015 and 2019. These
curves are constructed using the estimation method detailed in Section 2.3 but assuming a maximum capacity
factor of F = 2 instead of F = 1.5.
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A.13.

Appendix Chapter 2: Figures

Figure A.13.6: Cost-minimizing allocations under the four different scenarios (F = 2)

Notes: Figure presents the cost-minimizing allocation of new installations for the four different scenarios
described in Section 2.4. For each year, the vertical axis indicates new capacity across all states. The color
indicates what amount of that annual new capacity corresponds to each state. Total added capacity across
all states and years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220 MW, and is constant across scenarios. To
find the cost-minimizing allocation we solved the social planner’s problem using solar supply curves like the
ones in Section 2.3 but constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2 instead of F = 1.5.
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Figure A.13.7: Cost per GW in each scenario for different RPS targets (F = 2)

Notes: The left figure presents the cost per GW of implementing RPSs of varying stringency and under
different scenarios. The black vertical line labeled ’Obs RPS’ represents the GWs installed under the baseline
RPS. The right figure conveys the information in an alternative way. The color indicates the cost per GW
of implementing RPSs of different stringency (vertical axis) and under different policy designs (horizontal
axis). The black lines labeled ’Obs RPS’ indicate the GWs installed under the baseline RPS. Both figures
are created using solar supply curves like the ones in Section 2.3 but constructed assuming a maximum
capacity factor of F = 2 instead of F = 1.5.
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Figure A.13.8: Alternative interim RPS target schedules (left) and alternative allocations
of the RPS (right) (F = 2)

Notes: Figure (left) presents the cost increase of imposing interim schedules in the absence of geographic
trading restrictions. Each represents one of the three different types of RPS schedules presented in Table
2.6. Figure (right) presents the histogram of cost increases that result from imposing geographic trading
restrictions in the absence of interim targets. Each observation is the cost increase associated with a random
allocation of a fixed RPS target across states. Each color represents RPS targets of varying stringency.
Both figures are created using solar supply curves like the ones in Section 2.3 but constructed assuming a
maximum capacity factor of F = 2 instead of F = 1.5.
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Figure A.13.9: Cost-minimizing allocations under the four different scenarios (F = 2,
linear approximation)

Notes: Figure presents the cost-minimizing allocation of new installations for the four different scenarios
described in Section 2.4. For each year, the vertical axis indicates new capacity across all states. The color
indicates what amount of that annual new capacity corresponds to each state. Total added capacity across
all states and years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220 MW, and is constant across scenarios. To
find the cost-minimizing allocation we solved the social planner’s problem using solar supply curves like the
ones in Section 2.3 but constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 2 instead of F = 1.5 and
using a linear approximation instead of a double exponential approximation.
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Figure A.13.10: Cost per GW in each scenario for different RPS targets (F = 2, linear
approximation)

Notes: The left figure presents the cost per GW of implementing RPSs of varying stringency of the RPS
target, and under different scenarios. The black vertical line labeled ’Obs RPS’ represents the GWs installed
under the baseline RPS. The right figure conveys the information in an alternative way. The color indicates
the cost per GW of implementing RPSs of different stringency (vertical axis) and under different policy
designs (horizontal axis). The black lines labeled ’Obs RPS’ indicate the GWs installed under the baseline
RPS. Both figures are created using solar supply curves like the ones in Section 2.3 but constructed assuming
a maximum capacity factor of F = 2 instead of F = 1.5 and using a linear approximation instead of a double
exponential approximation.
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Figure A.13.11: Alternative RPS schedules (left) and alternative allocations of the RPS
(right) (F = 2, linear approximation)

Notes: Figure (left) presents the cost increase of imposing interim schedules in the absence of geographic
trading restrictions. Each represents one of the three different types of RPS schedules presented in Table
2.6. Figure (right) presents the histogram of cost increases that result from imposing geographic trading
restrictions in the absence of interim targets. Each observation is the cost increase associated with a random
allocation of a fixed RPS target across states. Each color represents RPS targets of varying stringency.
Both figures are created using solar supply curves like the ones in Section 2.3 but constructed assuming a
maximum capacity factor of F = 2 instead of F = 1.5 and using a linear approximation instead of a double
exponential approximation.
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Figure A.13.12: Cost-minimizing allocations under the four different scenarios (F = 1.5,
linear approximation)

Notes: Figure presents the cost-minimizing allocation of new installations for the four different scenarios
described in Section 2.4. For each year, the vertical axis indicates new capacity across all states. The color
indicates what amount of that annual new capacity corresponds to each state. Total added capacity across
all states and years is equal to the combined RPS target, 1,220 MW, and is constant across scenarios. To find
the cost-minimizing allocation we solved the social planner’s problem using solar supply curves like the ones
in Section 2.3 constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 1.5 and using a linear approximation
instead of a double exponential approximation.
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Figure A.13.13: Cost per GW in each scenario for different RPS targets (F = 1.5, linear
approximation)

Notes: Figure (left) presents the cost per GW of implementing RPSs of varying stringency of the RPS
target, and under different scenarios. The black vertical line labeled ’Obs RPS’ represents the GWs installed
under the baseline RPS. The color in the figure (right) indicates the cost per GW of implementing RPSs
of different target stringency (vertical axis), and under different policy designs (horizontal axis). The black
lines labeled ’Obs RPS’ indicate the GWs installed under the baseline RPS. Both figures are created using
solar supply curves like the ones in Section 2.3 constructed assuming a maximum capacity factor of F = 1.5
and using a linear approximation instead of a double exponential approximation.
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Figure A.13.14: Alternative RPS schedules (left) and alternative allocations of the RPS
(right) (F = 1.5, linear approximation)

Notes: Figure (left) presents the cost increase of imposing interim schedules in the absence of geographic
trading restrictions. Each represents one of the three different types of RPS schedules presented in Table
2.6. Figure (right) presents the histogram of cost increases that result from imposing geographic trading
restrictions in the absence of interim targets. Each observation is the cost increase associated with a random
allocation of a fixed RPS target across states. Each color represents RPS targets of varying stringency. Both
figures are created using solar supply curves like the ones in Section 2.3 using a linear approximation instead
of a double exponential approximation.
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Figure A.13.15: Alternative RPS schedules (left) and alternative allocations of the RPS
(right)

Notes: Figure (left) presents the cost increase of imposing interim schedules in the presence of geographic
trading restrictions. Each represents one of the three different types of RPS schedules presented in Table
2.6. Figure (right) presents the histogram of cost increases that result from imposing geographic trading
restrictions in the presence of interim targets. Each observation is the cost increase associated with a random
allocation of a fixed RPS target across states. Each color represents RPS targets of varying stringency. Both
figures are created using solar supply curves like the ones in Section 2.3 constructed assuming a maximum
capacity factor of F = 1.5 and using a double exponential approximation.
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